

Foucault Kritik

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Biopower 1NC

Transportation Infrastructure is the Ultimate Statement of Contemporary Biopolitics—The Movement and Placement of Populations Goes Hand in Hand With Technologies of Control and Manipulation that Undergrids War, Extermination and Violence

Julian Reid, University of Lapland, "On the Implications of Foucault's Security, Territory, Population Lectures for the Analysis and Theorisation of Security in International Relations," Symposium The Biopolitics of Development: Life, Welfare, and Unruly Populations," September 9th, 2010

(http://www.mcrq.ac.in/Development/draft_Symposium/Julian1.pdf)

In the current context of global politics that strategic relation of subordination of liberalism to sovereignty has been dramatically reconfigured. The clearest indication of this shift can be identified in the domain of security discourse and practice itself. **The liberalisation of international relations has produced a shift in the ways how security problems are conceived not just within states domestically but internationally. To the extent that the very functions of the sovereign powers of states, including the most powerful of Western states, are increasingly subject to liberal principles and rules.** Since the Cold War we have witnessed a veritable explosion in the discourses of, for example, 'human security' internationally; to the extent that states only make recourse to concepts of national interest in legitimisation of force where and when they can align those interests with that of 'the species as a whole'. **The triumph of this liberal humanitarian discourse internationally announces if not the death then at least the subordination of traditional institutions of state sovereignty to governance via liberal international institutions and practices amid an exponential growth in liberal humanitarian discourse.** In this context we are witnessing, I think, a phenomenon which bears distinct continuities with the then nascent forms of liberal security apparatuses which Foucault documents so assiduously within the context of domestic social relations within early modern states. It is in this sense that **contemporary liberal regimes of governance bear witness not just to continuities with Foucault's framework of analysis but to its reversal. The use of war over the last twenty years has undergone a transformation of epic proportions,** every bit as epochal as the change that it underwent under duress of the new forms of *raison d'Etat* which framed the organisation of the early modern international system. **Hence we are witnessing a reversal in the order of relations between liberal regimes and state sovereignty. War is only viable today, indeed can only legitimately be waged, where and when it can be demonstrated to serve the security of the liberal institutions and agencies to which formerly sovereign states now find themselves suborned.** The security discourses of the global liberal order reproduce so many of the tropes and signatures of the early modern liberal state which Foucault analyses in these lectures. He demonstrates how **the liberal state of the early modern era, on account of its problematisation of life as the referent object of security, invented entire new species of enmity and threats. Once the referent object of security became the life of the population so the circulatory infrastructures on which the life properties and processes of the populations of states were said to rely became identified as sites of insecurity and threat. So, new domains and practices of regulation concerned with the governance of roads and highways, the suppression of vagrancy, and so on, came into existence. The development of the contemporary global liberal order is generative of new and yet very comparable forms of security problems. An excellent example of this is the current discourse surrounding so-called 'rogue states', the constitutions of which are represented as hostile to the smooth functioning of the circulatory infrastructures of global liberal order.** Indeed the extension of this discourse of the rogue and of roguery to the international suggests, as Jacques Derrida has also demonstrated, continuities with liberal regimes of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. In a brilliant analysis which I think in many ways can be read as a supplement to Foucault's, delivered not long before his death, Derrida demonstrated the genealogical intertwinements of the word 'rogue' and its equivalents in French, 'voyou' and 'roué', with concepts of humanity and animality, and its roles in the development of liberal practices of security and order. In English the word 'rogue' designates deviance in both human and nonhuman life forms. Derrida demonstrates this by quoting from an article in which 'a rogue is defined as a creature that is born different...incapable of mingling with the herd, which keeps itself to itself, and can attack at any time, without warning'. Crucially, this concept of the rogue and of roguery derived from early modern theories of biology. In reference to the vegetable kingdom, Charles Darwin in *Origin of Species* referred to 'roguing' as the practice by which nurserymen would weed out plants that deviated from the proper standard of plants in seed-beds, literally pulling-up what they called the 'rogues'. He then adapted the concept of roguing to describe the process by which natural selection functions throughout living systems to maintain order among species. In French, Derrida argues, the word has a more human resonance, for 'the word voyou has an essential relation with the voie, the way, with the urban roadways (voirie), the roadways of the city or the polis, and thus with the street (rue), the waywardness (dévoisement) of the voyou consisting in making ill use of the street, in corrupting the street or loitering in the streets, in "roaming the streets"'

Biopower 1NC

We Must Break From The Apparatus of Biopower—The Technology of Unquestioned Power Has Lead to All the Violence of History and Risks Total Extinction

James W. Bernauer, Boston College, Michel Foucault's Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics of Thought, 1990, p. 140-142

This capacity of power to conceal itself cannot cloak the tragedy of the implications contained in Foucault's examination of its functioning. While liberals have fought to extend rights and Marxists have denounced the injustice of capitalism, a political technology, acting in the interests of a better administration of life, has produced politics that places man's "existence as a living being question." The very period that proclaimed pride in having overthrown the tyranny of monarchy, that engaged in an endless clamor for reform, that is confident in the virtues of its humanistic faith—this period's politics created a landscape dominated by history's bloodiest wars. What comparison is possible between a sovereign's authority to take a life and a power that, in the interest of protecting a society's quality of life, can plan, as well as develop the means for its implementation, a policy of mutually assured destruction? Such a policy is neither an aberration of the fundamental principles of modern politics nor an abandonment of our age's humanism in favor of a more primitive right to kill; it is but the other side of a power that is "situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population." The bio-political project of administering and optimizing life closes its circle with the production of the Bomb. "The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of a power to guarantee an individual's continued existence." The solace that might have been expected from being able to gaze at scaffolds empty of the victims of a tyrant's vengeance has been stolen from us by the noose that has tightened around each of our own necks. 2. THINKING AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR POLITICS That noose is loosened by breaking with the type of thinking that has led to its fashioning, and by a mode of political action that dissents from those practices of normalization that have made us all potential victims. A prerequisite for this break is the recognition that human being and thought inhabit the domain of knowledge-power relations (savoir-pouvoir), a realization that is in opposition to traditional humanism. In the light of SP and VS, man—that invention of recent date—continued to gain sharper focus. By means of that web of techniques of discipline and methods of knowing that exists in modern society by those minute steps of training through which the body was made into a fit instrument, and by those stages of examining the mind's growth, the "man of modern humanism was born." The same humanism that has invested such energy in developing a science of man has foisted upon us the illusion that power is essentially repressive; in doing so, it as led us into the dead end of regarding the pursuit and exercise of power as blinding the faculty of thought. Humanism maintains its position as Foucault's major opponent because it blocks the effort to think differently about the relations between knowledge and power. His weapon against this humanism continues to be a form of thinking that exposes human being to those dissonant series of events that subvert our normal philosophical and historical understanding. Foucault's thought and the action it motivates may be approached as two distinguishable elements. The next part of this section will look at his understanding of thought in terms of that strategic model within which Foucault is articulating it. A model that is of the greatest consequence for understanding the development of his style of thinking after AS's statement of method. In the region of power-knowledge relations, thinking finds itself allied with a political engagement, with a practice of dissent; the last part of this chapter will be given over to a consideration of Foucault's own political dissent.

Biopower 1NC

The Alternative is an Interrogation of the Strategies of Power—an Understanding of the New and Multiple Operations of Discourses Imbued With Power is Our Duty as Intellectuals

Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 1980, p.87-89

What is at stake in all these genealogies is the nature of this power which has surged into view in all its violence, aggression and absurdity in the course of the last forty years, contemporaneously, that is, with the collapse of Fascism and the decline of Stalinism. What, we must ask, is this bio power—or rather, since that is to give a formulation to the question that invites the kind of theoretical coronation of the whole which I am so keen to avoid—what are these various contrivances of power, whose operations extend to such differing levels and sectors of society and are possessed of such manifold ramifications? What are their mechanisms, their effects and their relations? The issue here can, I believe, be crystallised essentially in the following question: is the analysis of power or of powers to be deduced in one way or another from the economy? Let me make this question and my reasons for posing it somewhat clearer. It is not at all my intention to abstract from what are innumerable and enormous differences; yet despite, and even because of these differences, I consider there to be a certain point in common between the juridical, and let us call it, liberal, conception of political power (found in the philosophes of the eighteenth century) and the Marxist conception, or at any rate a certain conception currently held to be Marxist. I would call this common point an economism in the theory of power. By that I mean that in the case of the classic, juridical theory, power is taken to be a right, which one can possess like a commodity, and which one can in consequence transfer or alienate, either wholly or partially, through a legal act or through some act that establishes a right, such as takes place through cession or contract. Power is that concrete power which every individual holds, and whose partial or total cession enables political power or sovereignty to be established. This theoretical construction is essentially based on the idea that the constitution of political power obeys the model of a legal transaction involving a contractual type of exchange (hence the clear analogy that runs through all these theories between power and commodities, power and wealth). In the other case—I am thinking here of the general Marxist conception of power—one finds none of all that. Nonetheless, there is something else inherent in this latter conception, something which one might term an economic functionality of power. This economic functionality is present to the extent that power is conceived primarily in terms of the role it plays in the maintenance simultaneously of the relations of production and of a class domination which the development and specific forms of the forces of production have rendered possible. On this view, then, the historical *raison d'être* of political power is to be found in the economy. Broadly speaking, in the first case we have a political power whose formal model is discoverable in the process of exchange, the economic circulation of commodities; in the second case, the historical *raison d'être* of political power and the principle of its concrete forms and actual functioning, is located in the economy. Well then, the problem involved in the researches to which I refer can, I believe, be broken down in the following manner: in the first place, is power always in a subordinate position relative to the economy? Is it always in the service of, and ultimately answerable to, the economy? Is its essential end and purpose to serve the economy? Is it destined to realise, consolidate, maintain and reproduce the relations appropriate to the economy and essential to its functioning? In the second place, is power modelled upon the commodity? Is it something that one possesses, acquires, cedes through force or contract, that one alienates or recovers, that circulates, that voids this or that region? Or, on the contrary, do we need to employ varying tools in its analysis—even, that is, when we allow that it effectively remains the case that the relations of power do indeed remain profoundly enmeshed in and with economic relations and participate with them in a common circuit? If that is the case, it is not the models of functional subordination or formal isomorphism that will characterise the interconnection between politics and the economy. Their indissolubility will be of a different order, one that it will be our task to determine.

Links—Transportation**The Circulation of Goods and People is Analogous to the Police—Keeping the Population Stable and In Place So they Can Be Disciplined and Monitored**

Ben Golder, Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of New South Wales, “Foucault and the Genealogy of Pastoral Power,” *Radical Philosophy Review*, 2007

(http://www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/files/mdocs/RPR_Golder.pdf)

It is at this juncture that Foucault introduces the doctrine of *raison d'État*, and through a reading in lectures nine and ten of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theorists of *raison d'État* such as Palazzo, Bacon, Naudé and Chemnitz (placed in negative proximity to Machiavelli), he elucidates the circular and immanent logic of the doctrine: “The end of *raison d'État* is the state itself, and if there is something like perfection, happiness, or felicity, it will only ever be the perfection, happiness or felicity of the state itself” (p. 258). This maintenance of the state’s forces pursuant to this new art of government necessitates “setting up two major assemblages of political technology” (p. 312). Accordingly, the state is placed in both an external and an internal field: first, what is required externally is the maintenance of the competitive equilibrium of national power in Europe (discussed in lecture eleven); and secondly, what is deployed internally is the doctrine of police (discussed in lecture twelve). In short, through a reading of German writers of *Polizeiwissenschaft* such as von Justi, and French theorists of police such as Delamare and Turquet de Mayerne, Foucault describes how this political technology of police intervenes in the daily life of the subjects of a state in everything from the circulation of goods and people, to the maintenance of sanitation and health, the guaranteeing of public security and order, and the construction of infrastructure. In short, police aims at “everything from being to well-being, everything that may produce this well-being beyond being, and in such a way that the well-being of individuals is the state’s strength” (p. 328). Police is the science of internal administration; it is “administrative modernity par excellence” (p. 321).

Links—Transportation Infrastructure

**Transportation Infrastructure is Directed at the Population as the Ultimate Unit of Biopolitics—
The Preoccupation of Movement and Maintenance of That Population is a Discursive Attempt
to Back Up State Authority**

Kirk S. Kidwell, PhD Candidate at Ohio State, "READING THE STATE WRITING: MICHEL FOUCAULT AND THE PRODUCTION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE," 2003

(<http://etd.ohiolink.edu/view.cgi/Kidwell%20Kirk%20S.pdf?osu1060889599>)

Population not only functioned as the key term in the emergence of bio-power during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; it also continues to serve as the fundamental problem for government in modern Western bio-political cultures, like that of the United States. Population operates at once as the object, the instrumentality, and the legitimation of governmental power, and, consequently, as the quintessential domain of bio-power.²⁰ As the object: governmental power always and everywhere targets the population of a nation. Whether the issue at hand be that of education or the economy, of foreign policy or national security, of criminal justice or urban development, of agriculture or transportation, of health care or the environment, the performance of governmental power is directed at the population. The population of the United States, for example, is encouraged by the state to consume certain foods—high in dietary fiber—and not others—high in cholesterol and fat; or it is directed toward certain behaviors— watching educational and family-oriented programs on television—and not others— watching violent and sexually-oriented programs; or it is enlisted to support military actions in distant countries—Vietnam, Grenada, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan—and to promote domestic tranquility—fight crime, oppose illegal immigration, end spousal and child abuse; and the list could go on. As the instrumentality: governmental power not only acts on population, but also through population. Consider the case of taxation. The power to tax operates on population in the sense that the population is the source of revenue and, hence, it is the population as a collectivity of individuals and corporations which is taxed. But the power to tax also operates through the population in that taxation is used as an instrument for accomplishing other governmental objectives besides raising revenue: alcohol and tobacco are taxed not only as a means of raising revenue but also as a means of regulating the consumption of these products and thereby as a means of managing the health problems caused by that consumption²¹; gasoline is taxed, again, as a means of regulating its consumption, as well as a means of funding the management of the transportation infrastructure of the nation; the home mortgage deduction serves as a means of encouraging home ownership; and so on. As the legitimation: the performance of governmental power is legitimated through an appeal to the welfare of the population. Governmental action is legitimated as "good" to the extent that it promotes the general welfare, "bad" to the extent that it diminishes that welfare. Foreign policy, for instance, is good when it defends the "national interest"—the security of the population—bad when it betrays that interest. Economic policy is good when it fosters growth and expansion—the wealth of the population—bad when it results in stagnation and recession. And, of course, health policy is good when it prevents disease and improves the quality of life—the health of the population—bad when it fails to do so. So then, population is the object, the instrumentality, and the legitimation of bio-power and therefore must be understood, in a general sense, as the domain of bio-power. But from a Foucauldian perspective, I would argue, population as the domain of bio-power ought to be conceived more specifically as comprising three particular and intricately linked elements: sexuality, the family, and public health.

Links—Transportation Infrastructure

Disease Management Proves that Transportation Infrastructure is a Strategy to Control and Discipline Populations

Diane M. Nelson, Associate Professor of Cultural Anthropology at Duke University “Life During Wartime: Guatemala, Vitality, Conspiracy, Milieu,” in [Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics](http://illinois.academia.edu/JonathanInda/Books/396166/Anthropologies_of_Modernity_Foucault_Governmentality_and_Life_Politics), 2005 (http://illinois.academia.edu/JonathanInda/Books/396166/Anthropologies_of_Modernity_Foucault_Governmentality_and_Life_Politics)

Malaria is an imperial disease.¹⁶ It was brought to the Americas by the Spanish colonizers and it takes the heaviest toll on nonlocals in tropical areas, including highland Maya forced to descend to the tropics for work. In 1908 Brault wrote, “fever and dysentery are the ‘generals’ that defend hot countries against our incursions and prevent us from replacing the aborigines that we have to make use of” (in Latour 1988: 141). The French, British, and US race to find a cure in the late 1800s was meant to keep whites alive in their new milieu, and the legal and later virtual enslavement of Africans and their Caribbean descendents in the feverridden agro-export zones was justified by their supposed immunity. Creating transportation infrastructure like canals and railroads, stationing armies, clearing ground to plant and harvest tropical products, all had to confront (in addition to uprisings, escape, work slowdowns, and other human-level obstacles) the invisible microbial resistance and its effects. As Adams wrote in 1914: the natives would not work on plantations, and most of them still have an unconquerable aversion to sustained physical toil. The reason is not far to seek. The mosquitoes . . . have so inoculated them with their virus that they have neither the ambition nor the strength to compete with workers not thus afflicted. It is entirely possible that a generation of Central American natives of the laboring class might, if forced or persuaded to conform to modern sanitary science, surprise the world by displaying none of the laziness inherent in those who now inhabit mosquito-ridden sections. (267)

These biopolitical strategies of “modern sanitary science” – hygiene, medicine, health (what Latour calls Pasteurization or the S-5 might call “giving water”) – are aimed at life. Their goal is both the life of the individual body – “the adjustment and economy of energies” (for Adams, the worker’s body) – and the social body – “the regulation of populations, through the far-reaching effects of its activity” (Adams foresees entire classes and subsequent generations improved by these interventions). Like sex, malaria eradication “fitted in both categories at once, giving rise to infinitesimal surveillances, permanent controls, extremely meticulous orderings of space, indeterminate medical or psychological examinations, to an entire micro-power concerned with the body. But it gave rise as well to comprehensive measures, statistical assessments, and interventions aimed at the entire social body or at groups taken as a whole” (Foucault 1980: 145–146).

Links—Infrastructure**Infrastructure Building is a Governmental Strategy to Ensure the Stability and Compliance of the Population**

Victor Tadros, School of Law, King's College London, "Between Governance and Discipline: The Law and Michel Foucault," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Spring, 1998 (JSTOR)

The method through which these aims were to be achieved was through what Foucault calls the 'disposal' of things. By disposal he means an arrangement of things through which one can achieve certain ends. But the things are not just objects. They are 'a sort of complex composed of men and things' (G: 93); that is, men in relation to objects and events in the world. Government was utilized to make adjustments in the relationships between men and things which became available to it through the economy. Foucault, then, describes a three-tier network of government. The population was the object for analysis and alteration; for disposal. The government was the political technology which performs this alteration and the economy was a field of action which connected the two together. The economy both provided a description of the population and a place where governmental decisions could be organized. Government could intervene tactically into the economy by utilizing laws but it could also do so by adjusting taxation, prescribing standards for education, by building an infrastructure as well as by directing moral and religious education.

Links—Infrastructure

Contemporary Strategies for the Defense of Infrastructure Demonstrates the Necessity of This Technology for the Maintenance of the Biopolitical State

Julian Reid, University of Lapland, "On the Implications of Foucault's Security, Territory, Population Lectures for the Analysis and Theorisation of Security in International Relations," Symposium The Biopolitics of Development: Life, Welfare, and Unruly Populations," September 9th, 2010

(http://www.mcrg.ac.in/Development/draft_Symposium/Julian1.pdf)

In their responses to terrorism, liberal regimes of the present have made the protection of global architectures of circulation and infrastructure a strategic priority. The conduct of the Global War on Terror has been defined in particular by the development of strategies for the protection of 'critical infrastructure'. In the US, for example, George W. Bush has provided a series of presidential directives in response to the attacks of September 11 for the development of what is termed a National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The response to the directive is expressed in The National Plan for Research and Development in Support of Critical Infrastructure Protection published by the US Department of Homeland Security in 2004. In Europe, the European Union is pursuing what it terms a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection 'to enhance European prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks involving critical infrastructures'. The United Nations is seeking meanwhile to identify the critical infrastructure needs of member states globally, as well as continuing to 'explore ways to facilitate the dissemination of best practices' with regard to critical infrastructure protection. Intriguingly, the concept of the 'rogue' is regularly used to describe the various forms of threat posed to critical infrastructure in the social jurisdictions of liberal regimes. Not only rogue states, but non-state 'rogue actors' and even pre-individual 'rogue behaviours' are increasingly singled out as the sources of insecurity for a global liberal order the welfare of which is conceived in circulatory and infrastructural terms. In the nineteenth century the protection of liberal order from the threats posed by 'rogues' involved securing life, as Derrida describes, on 'the street, in a city, in the urbanity and good conduct of urban life'. In the twenty-first century the 'paths of circulation' on which rogues are feared to roam are that much more complex and require that much more insidious methods of protection. The evaluation of threats is said to require 'detailed analysis in order to detect patterns and anomalies, understanding and modelling of human behaviour, and translation of these sources into threat information'. It is likewise said to require the development of new technologies able to provide 'analysis of deceptive behaviours, cognitive capabilities, the use of everyday heuristics' and 'the systematic analysis of what people do and where lapses do – and do not – occur'. It requires not just the surveillance and control of the social body as a whole, or of the movements and dispositions of individuals, but rather, techniques which target and seize control of life beneath the molecular thresholds of its biological functioning and existence.

Links—Strengthening Infrastructure

Strengthening Infrastructure is the Same for Contemporary Societies as It Was For the 18th Century—We Sustain the Machinery of Society Above and Beyond The Society Itself—The Individuals are Irrelevant as Long as the Machine Continues to Function

Julian Reid, University of Lapland, "On the Implications of Foucault's Security, Territory, Population Lectures for the Analysis and Theorisation of Security in International Relations," Symposium The Biopolitics of Development: Life, Welfare, and Unruly Populations," September 9th, 2010

(http://www.mcrq.ac.in/Development/draft_Symposium/Julian1.pdf)

While it is a fact that the biological imaginaries of liberal regimes have played a significant role in constituting the types of threat that they face, it is also a fact that the major adversaries of liberal regimes today base their strategies on the deliberate targeting of their circulatory capacities and 'critical infrastructures'. Groups such as Al-Qaeda are regarded as significant threats precisely because they deliberately target the 'critical infrastructures' which enable the liberality of these regimes rather than simply the human beings which inhabit them. Indeed, key intelligence sources, such as the FBI, report that Al-Qaeda are making the targeting of critical infrastructures their tactical priority. In Iraq, the insurgency is defined by similar methods involving the targeting of key infrastructure projects.

These strategies of protection, implemented by liberal regimes to secure themselves from terrorism, resemble acutely those with which liberal states of the early modern era sought to secure themselves from the threat of sedition. In the 18th century the rationale was that the prevention of sedition required the promotion of internal trade and the general improvement of circulation among the domestic population. As the political influence of liberalism developed from the late eighteenth century onwards, so the task of identifying, strengthening, and securing the hidden infrastructures of societies became an increasingly prevalent goal and practice among governments. This understanding of the sources of security was fast politicised in the development not just of liberal political and philosophical thought, but in the development of the new governmental practices with which states would seek to enhance the resilience of the infrastructures of relations which would become the benchmarks of both their geo- and bio-political power. Government became the art and technique by which life would be tactically distributed and circulated in the 'network of relations' comprising the infrastructures of liberalising societies.

The liberal conception of society as an organism comprising networks and infrastructures of relations gathered apace throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, culminating in the prevailing conception of a networked world society held together and empowered economically, social, politically, and militarily by the density of its critical infrastructures. Likewise the principle that the regimes which govern such societies are vulnerable on account of their reliance on the vitality of those networked infrastructures, the principle governing Al-Qaeda's strategy, developed simultaneously within liberal regimes themselves. This was evident not least in the development of the practice of interstate warfare. The increasing investment in the strategic value of airpower in the UK, the US, and France during the twentieth century worked on the assumption that enemies could be defeated by inflicting critical damage on the infrastructures on which their security depended. Today we see the same logic being applied not just within the domain of liberal regimes themselves, but in the violent intervention and enforced reconstruction of illiberal states and societies. The solution to Terror is presumed to lie in the destruction of illiberal regimes, in the regeneration of their socio-economic infrastructures of circulation, with a view to reinserting them into the networks of exchange and flows which constitute the global liberal polity.

Links—Product Distribution

The Technology of Product Distribution is a Process of Domination, Engineers the Process of Civilization and Consumption

Paul Rabinow, Professor of Anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley. "Artificiality and Enlightenment: From Sociobiology to Biosociality," in [Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics](http://illinois.academia.edu/JonathanInda/Books/396166/Anthropologies_of_Modernity_Foucault_Governmentality_and_Life_Politics), 2005 (http://illinois.academia.edu/JonathanInda/Books/396166/Anthropologies_of_Modernity_Foucault_Governmentality_and_Life_Politics)

The emergence of modern food, that is, food industrially processed to emphasize uniformity and commoditized as part of an internationalization of world agriculture and distribution, can be dated to the 1870–1914 period. Industrial sugar refining and flour milling for the production of white bread was one of the first examples of a constructed consumer need linked to advertising, transportation expansion, a host of processing and preservation techniques, as well as incidentally the rise of modernism in architecture (for example, Buffalo's silos and Minneapolis' grain elevators, as Reyner Banham has shown in his *Concrete Atlantis*).
 16 With these changes agricultural products were on their way to becoming merely an input factor in the production of food, and food was on its way to becoming a "heterogeneous commodity endowed with distinctive properties imparted by processing techniques, product differentiation, and merchandising."
 17 These processes accelerated during World War I, which here, as in so many other domains, provided the laboratory conditions for inventing, testing, and improving food products on a truly mass scale. Millions of people became accustomed to transformed natural products like evaporated milk as well as new foods like margarine, in which an industrially transformed product substituted for a processed "rural" product, vegetable fats instead of butter. Using methods developed in the textile industry, it was now possible not only to produce foods at industrial levels not constrained by the "natural rhythms" or inherent biological qualities (even if people had bred for these), but even to get people to buy and eat them.

Links—Dynamics of the City/Urban/Suburbs**The Dynamics of Urban and Suburban Transit and the Spatial Organization of Populations is an Extension of the Regulation of the Body and Power**

Matthew Gandy, Department of Geography, University College London, "Zones of indistinction: bio-political contestations in the urban arena," *Cultural Geographies*, 2006

(<http://www.matthewgandy.org/datalive/downloadfiles/culturalgeog.pdf>)

If we take Foucault's term 'medicine' in a more general sense to mean the regulation of the body and its relation to the urban environment then we can trace a link between the development of 'medico-administrative' knowledge and the hygienist preoccupation with the control of urban space.²⁴ The spread of new attitudes towards hygiene and cleanliness involved a transformation in the cultural meaning and 'stigmatization' of the human body as new forms of social distinction emerged. The development of new social formations in the industrial city coincided with the spread of intensified forms of spatial differentiation as transport improvements enabled the middle classes to escape the poverty and congestion of the inner city. In tandem with the newly emerging socio-spatial disparities of the industrial city, we encounter an emphasis on increasingly individualized forms of identity and a growing aversion to the communal sensory realm of the past.²⁵ The handling of human faeces, for example, which had for centuries been an everyday aspect of urban life as night soil collectors delivered human waste to regional agricultural hinterlands, suddenly became caught up in a new set of behavioural, olfactory and scientific discourses.²⁶ Human waste, which had previously enjoyed a sacred role within organic conceptions of urban order, was transformed into an object of disgust. This 'ambiguity of the sacred', to use E' mile Durkheim's expression, reveals the way in which the significance of the same object can oscillate between auspicious or inauspicious meanings without changing.²⁷ The body is thus intertwined with shifting topographies of dirt and defilement that reflect wider processes of social and cultural change within the modern city as the mixed, compact and cyclical characteristics of the pre-modern city were superseded by an increasingly differentiated and sprawling urban form underpinned by the cyclical perturbations of capital rather than the organic demands of a bio-regional economy.

Links—Cities

The Construction of the City is the Biopolitical Basis of Governmentality, The Organization and Distribution of Populations is in the Fundamental Interest of the Ruling Apparatus

Matthew Gandy, Department of Geography, University College London, "Zones of indistinction: bio-political contestations in the urban arena," Cultural Geographies, 2006

(<http://www.matthewgandy.org/datalive/downloadfiles/culturalgeog.pdf>)

The bio-political dynamics of the modern city originate within an extending nexus of hybridized relations between the body, nature and urban space, so that the structure of the city tends towards a cyborgian synthesis between the physiological needs of the human body and the physical infrastructure of the city.³⁰ The idea of the 'cyborg city' can be invoked in this sense as a technological enhancement of urban life that involves an increasingly elaborate intersection between nature and culture in the urban arena. The provision of basic necessities such as food, water and warmth rests on a web of technological and organizational structures that have facilitated the interaction between the cyclical dynamics of capital and the transformation of nature into exchangeable commodities. In the case of water the rationalization of the modern city involved not just a transformation in the physical structure of the city _ often extending far beyond the city boundaries _ but also changes in the use and meaning of private and public space. The incorporation of the human body into the physical fabric of the modern city via the circulatory dynamics of water infrastructure illustrates the extent to which new forms of government or 'governmentality' have impinged on everyday life as communal spaces for washing or bathing became associated with 'sensuality and individual debasement'.³¹ At first these changes were instituted simply by improved access to water, but through time the hydrological dynamics of the modern city were embellished by a plethora of new technologies and advertising campaigns, so that hygienist ideologies became intertwined with popular culture. The modern home became an axiomatic space of liberal governmentality where new codes of behaviour evolved in tandem with a panoply of architectural and technical innovations. The role of women, for example, was transformed into that of 'environmental managers' for the domestic interior, whilst the modern bathroom instilled new standards of bodily hygiene.³² Although the spread of these new technological and architectural interactions with the human body was largely restricted to middle-class homes until the wider diffusion of prosperity in the second half of the twentieth century, the emphasis on water and health extended beyond the private bathroom to include the construction of municipal baths, lidos and other elements in an emerging modernist intersection between water, architectural design and urban culture.³³ By the early decades of the twentieth century the 'domesticated' human body had become fully woven into the social and institutional nexus of modernity, even if the technological transformation of the home had only been partially completed.

Links—GPS

GPS is a System of Surveillance For The Widespread Manipulation, Tracking and Knowledge Expansion of Power

Fraser MacDonald, PhD and Master's from Oxford, Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh, "Anti-Astropolitik - outer space and the orbit of geography", Progress in Human Geography, October 2007 (Proquest)

If the geopolitics of surveillance is particularly evident at the level of the state, it applies also to the organization of the daily activities of its citizens (Molz, 2006). GPS technology is perhaps the most evident incursion of space-enabled military surveillance systems into everyday life, becoming an indispensable means of monitoring the location of people and things. For instance, the manufacturer Pro Tech, riding the wave of public concern about paedophilia in Britain, has developed systems currently being trialled by the UK Home Office to track the movements of registered sex offenders (see also Monmonier, 2002: 134). Somewhat predictably, given the apparent crisis in the spatialities of childhood (Jones et al., 2003), children are to be the next subjects of satellite surveillance. In December 2005, the company mTrack launched i-Kids, a mobile phone/GPS unit that allows parents to track their offspring by PC or on a WAP enabled mobile phone. Those with pets rather than children might consider the \$460 RoamEO GPS system that attaches to your dog's collar, should walkies ever get out of hand. It will surprise no one that the same technology gets used for less savoury purposes: a Los Angeles stalker was jailed for 16 months for attaching a GPS device to his ex-girlfriend's car (Teather, 2004). What is more startling, perhaps, is that one does not need to be a GPS user to be subject to the surveillant possibilities of this technology. Anyone who leaves their mobile phone unattended for five minutes can be tracked, not just by the security services, but by any individual who has momentary access to enable the phone as a tracking device. For the purposes of a newspaper story, the Guardian journalist Ben Goldacre 'stalked' his girlfriend by registering her phone on one of many websites for the commercial tracking of employees and stock (Goldacre, 2006). The exercise revealed how easily everyday technologies like the mobile phone can be reconfigured for very different purposes. Even this modest labour in tracking a mobile phone will become a thing of the past. Phones will be more specifically configured as a tracking device: Nokia is due to release a GPS phone in 2007, while the Finnish company Benefon has already launched its Twig Discovery, a phone that has a 'finder' capability that locates and tracks other contacts in your address book. Should the user come within range of another contact, the phone will send a message asking whether you are willing to reveal your location to this contact. If both parties are agreeable, the phones will guide their users to each other. In this way, the gadgetry of space-enabled espionage is being woven into interpersonal as well as interstate and citizen-state relations. If the movements of a car can be tracked by a jealous boyfriend, they can also be tracked by the state for the purposes of taxation: this is surely the future of road tolls in the UK. A British insurance company is already using satellite technology to cut the premiums for young drivers if they stay off the roads between 11pm and 6am, when most accidents occur. Information about the time, duration and route of every single journey made by the driver is recorded and sent back to the company (Bachelor, 2006). The success of geotechnologies will lie in these ordinary reconfigurations of life such as tracking parcels, locating stolen cars, transport guidance or assisting the navigation of the visually impaired. Some might argue, however, that their impact will be more subtle still. For instance, Nigel Thrift locates the power of new forms of positioning in precognitive sociality and 'prereflexive practice', that is to say in 'various kinds of culturally inculcated corporeal automatisms' (Thrift, 2004b: 175). In other words, these sociotechnical changes may become so incorporated into our unconscious that we simply cease to think about our position. Getting lost may become difficult (Thrift, 2004b: 188). Perhaps we are not at that stage yet. But one can easily envisage GPS technologies enhancing existing inequalities in the very near future, such as the device that will warn the cautious urban walker that they are entering a 'bad neighbourhood'. In keeping with the logic of the panopticon, this is less 'Big Brother' than an army of little brothers: the social life of the new space age is already beginning to look quite different. And it is to this incipient militarization of everyday life that the emerging literature on 'military geographies' (Woodward, 2004; 2005) must surely turn its attention.

Links—Nuclear War

The Risk of Nuclear Catastrophe is Manipulated By Security Authorities to Ensure Tolerance of Perpetual “Small-Scale” Violence

Jeffrey Bussolini, Associate Professor of Sociology and Women's Studies, College of Staten Island, “Nuclear State of Exception: Reading and Extension of Foucault's Concepts of Biopower and Biopolitics in Agamben and the Nuclear Age” Abstracts: Foucault Circle 2008 (<http://foucault.siu.edu/pdf/abs08.pdf>)

Near the beginning of *Stato di eccezione*, Giorgio Agamben includes a very telling quotation from Rossiter: “Nell'era atomica in cui il mondo sta ora entrando, è probabile che l'uso dei poteri di emergenza costituzionale divenga la regola e non l'eccezione. (In the atomic era into which the world is now entering, it is likely that the use of constitutional emergency powers will become the rule rather than the exception).” Studying the atomic age along these lines, as well as those of the earlier considerations on biopolitics in Agamben's *Homo Sacer* and Michel Foucault's lecture courses at the Collège de France from 1976–1979 (including the crucial concepts of permanent war and the importance of conquest and colonization in contemporary state structures), bears out Rossiter's quotation—the advent of nuclear technology has indeed coincided with an augmentation of biopolitics and continued hostility both between and within states. By any reckoning nuclear weapons are major artifacts of geopolitics and biopolitics. They are inherently geopolitical tools that emerged from a history of intense inter-state conflict, and their scope and effects make any use a geopolitical event (despite repeated attempts to fashion smaller ‘battlefield’ or ‘tactical’ nukes and come up with scenarios for their employment). The nuclear age is characterized by distrust and hostility between states as well as suspicion of a state's own citizens and populations (as foreign agents, active threats, or as insufficiently disciplined to handle the secrets and necessary actions of security). Lending credence to the notion that the atomic age is closely linked to a state of exception as nationalist norm, all countries that have developed nuclear arms have substantial secret institutions devoted to developing them and devising plans for their possible use. Nuclear secrets are among the most closely guarded of national security matters. In the United States, all information about nuclear arms is ‘born classified’ and automatically subject to strict controls, the only such category in U.S. classification. The 1947 Smyth Report on the Manhattan Project and U.S. nuclear science says that the secrets of the weapons “must remain secret now and for all time.” Clearly these are regarded as central pillars of geopolitics. The very real threat of Armageddon from these weapons easily gives way to thinking of expediency and triage which instrumentalizes certain populations. The fate of those at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the continuing collection of data about them by the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, has been described in Robert Jay Lifton's *Death in Life*. Thousands of soldiers and scientists from different nations have been exposed in tests and research. Indigenous people from the American southwest to the Pacific Islands, Kazakhstan, and Algeria have been forcefully relocated to make room for atomic tests, exposed to radiation, or both. Groups such as prisoners and mental patients have been subjected to radiation experiments against their will or knowledge, supposedly for the purpose of building up crucial knowledge about nuclear effects, as documented in Eileen Welsome's *Plutonium Files* and Department of Energy reports on Human Radiation Experiments. These weapons, then, are intimately tied to power over life and death and the management of subject populations. As such, it seems that the exigency related to nuclear thinking justifies (or is the expression of) significant sovereign power over bare life. In the histories mentioned here, survival and protection of the population at large was seen to validate causing death or illness among smaller subsets of that population. One can note that, given their scale, nuclear weapons force consideration of population-level dynamics, as whole populations are placed at risk. In this respect, these arms follow on and accentuate the massive strategic bombing of World War II in which enemy populations were targeted as vital biopolitical resources.

Links—Security Discourse**Depictions of Catastrophic Danger are Intended to Solidify the Pre-Determined Foreign Policy of the State Apparatus**

David Campbell, Professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle, *Writing Security*, 1998 (p. 47-48)

To talk of the endangered nature of the modern world and the enemies and threats that abound in it is thus not to offer a simple ethnographic description of our condition; it is to invoke a discourse of danger through which the incipient ambiguity of our world can be grounded in accordance with the insistences of identity. Danger (death, in its ultimate form) might therefore be thought of as the new god for the modern world of states, not because it is peculiar to our time, but because it replicates the logic of Christendom's evangelism of fear. Indeed, in a world in which state identity is secured through discourses of danger, some low tactics are employed to serve these high ideals. These tactics are not inherent to the logic of identity, which only requires the definition of difference. But securing an ordered self and an ordered world—particularly when the field upon which this process operates is as extensive as a state—involves defining elements that stand in the way of order as forms of "otherness."⁵⁰ Such obstructions to order "become dirt, matter out of place, irrationality, abnormality, waste, sickness, perversity, incapacity, disorder, madness, unfreedom. They become material in need of rationalization, normalization, moralization, correction, punishment, discipline, disposal, realization, etc."⁵¹ In this way, the state project of security replicates the church project of salvation. The state grounds its legitimacy by offering the promise of security to its citizens who, it says, would otherwise face manifold dangers. The church justifies its role by guaranteeing salvation to its followers who, it says, would otherwise be destined to an unredeemed death. Both the state and the church require considerable effort to maintain order within and around themselves, and thereby engage in an evangelism of fear to ward off internal and external threats, succumbing in the process to the temptation to treat difference as otherness. In contrast to the statist discourse of international relations, this understanding proffers an entirely different orientation to the question of foreign policy. In addition to the historical discussion above, which suggested that it was possible to argue that the state was not prior to the interstate system, this interpretation means that instead of regarding foreign policy as the external view and rationalist orientation of a preestablished state, the identity of which is secure before it enters into relations with others, we can consider foreign policy as an integral part of the discourses of danger that serve to discipline the state. The state, and the identity of "man" located in the state, can therefore be regarded as the effects of discourses of danger that more often than not employ strategies of otherness. Foreign policy thus needs to be understood as giving rise to a boundary rather than acting as a bridge. (47-48)

Links—Autonomy**The Idea of Liberal Autonomy is a Trap—It Pretends That Repression Can Be Avoided Through Governmental Decision Making**

Jon Simons, Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, FOUCAULT AND THE POLITICAL, 1995, p. 78.

This trap is presented in Foucault's reversal of the repressive hypothesis a Freudian-Marxist belief that we can liberate ourselves by liberating our sexuality, which is held to be the core of our subjectivity. According to Foucault, bio-power ties us to our sexual identities, leading us to believe that we are our sexuality. In general, bio-power aims to optimize all human life forces, such as libido, yet resistance to it is posed in terms of the same life forces that bio-power targets. Against the power over life there are struggles of the "right" to life, to one's body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs, and beyond all "alienations", the "right" to rediscover what one is and all that one can be' (1978b: 145). If one believes one is one's sexuality, then struggle takes the form of anti-repression. Yet such revolution is 'nothing more, but nothing less... than a tactical shift and reversal' (131). Ironically, we believe that our liberation is at stake (159). Humanist political rationality contributes to this entrapment because it is based on an antimony of totalization and individualization. The struggle for freedom of individuals in the West has taken the form of the 'acquisition of capabilities'. Initially conceived as a fight for greater autonomy, this struggle has been accompanied by the development of political technologies, disciplines and normalization processes (1984c: 47-48). These practices and techniques of government subjectify the supposedly free or to-be-freed subject. The state has built its strength not only by paying attention to the totality of its resources by enhancing the potential of every individual under its auspices (1982a: 213-4). Modern pastoral government invests in the capacities of the individual, developing qualities of rationality, autonomy and decision making. It also invests in capacities that are thought to escape rational confines: the body, spontaneity, creativity and the libido. Foucault ascribes the 'failure' of our political theories to 'the fact that this integration of individuals in a community or in a totality results from a constant correlation between an increasing individualization and the reinforcement of this totality' (1988k: 161-2). The perversity of modern humanism is that the more Promethean we become, the more Sisyphean are our efforts.

Links—The Body

Conceptions of the Body are Based on Constructions of Power and Surveillance

Hugh Baxter, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University, "Bringing Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault. Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance," Stanford Law Review, January, 1996, p. lexis

Sovereign, monarchical power, Foucault explains, operated through the periodic extraction of revenue or goods ⁵² and through occasional but spectacular infliction of punishment by which the royal power exacted its revenge ⁵³ and "displayed itself in its murderous splendor." ⁵⁴ Sovereign power is thus negative, extractive, and destructive. Disciplinary power, by contrast, employs surveillance, organization, and training to make its object, primarily the human body, more useful and productive. ⁵⁵ Disciplinary power is micropower: It works on the human body " 'retail,' individually," extending "an infinitesimal [*455] power over the active body." ⁵⁶ Disciplinary power produces docile and useful bodies. ⁵⁷

While Foucault acknowledges the use of disciplinary methods before the modern period, he argues that it was only in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that they became "general formulas of domination." ⁵⁸ In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault traces the spread of disciplinary technologies in the military, ⁵⁹ schools, ⁶⁰ workshops and factories, ⁶¹ orphanages, ⁶² hospitals, ⁶³ and prisons. ⁶⁴ Foucault describes three basic principles of disciplinary technology that were implemented in these institutions. "Hierarchical observation" involves arranging individuals (often architecturally) in order to ensure their continuous surveillance. ⁶⁵ "Normalizing judgment" uses small penalties and rewards to encourage norm-conforming behavior, such as punctuality and diligence. ⁶⁶ "The examination" combines both of these techniques and places individuals under "a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify, and punish." ⁶⁷ When performed systematically throughout a particular population, examinations create documentary records establishing what is "normal" for the population and arranging individuals according to those norms. ⁶⁸ In this way, individuals are constituted as objects of both power and of disciplinary technology's individualizing form of knowledge. ⁶⁹ Indeed, Foucault claims, "the individual is ... a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called 'discipline.'" ⁷⁰

Links—Democracy**The Structure of Democracy Aims at the Process of Surveillance and Authority**

Kristin Savell, Lecturer at the University of Sydney Law, "Human Rights in the Age of Technology," The Sydney Law Review, September, 2001, p. 451-452.

Hunt and Wickham interpret Foucault as distinguishing law and discipline as 'dual but opposing processes.'
n186 They argue that whilst Foucault frequently 'counterposes law and discipline in order to highlight the distinctiveness of the modern disciplines' n187 he is best understood as 'drawing attention to the interaction and interdependence of disciplinary practices and their legal framework.' n188 They offer two interpretations of the relationship between law and discipline in Foucault's thought. The first is the 'broadly historical thesis' n189 that the 'advent of representational democracy existed side by side with the rise of an expanding disciplinary continuum' n190 with the result that law legitimated disciplinary power and merely masked the domination of normalising discourses. [*452] The second 'and more interesting' n191 interpretation is that law exists in competition with disciplinary power, without resolution. Expanding on this argument they write: Law in this guise expresses the paradox of modernity. Confronted by the rise of new disciplines, that are themselves exterior to law, the response of law is to seek to control or 'recode them in the form of law'. n192

Links—Disease**Containing Infectious Disease Via Public Health Strategies is a Function of Biopower and the Regulatory Apparatus**

Alison Bashford, "Global biopolitics and the history of world health," *History of the Human Sciences*, 2006, p. 67

The governance of 'world space' is currently intriguing many political, social and legal theorists. The folding of movement and migration into health and hygiene regulatory practices increasingly characterized the modern period. In this way, one of the major modes by which 'world space' was imagined and problematized was through 'world health', its predecessor 'international hygiene', and the problem of origin: quarantine. Bound originally to national borders, and especially to in-between zones of the oceans, quarantine logic evolved into an increasingly global governance of subjects as the imperative of health spread. Importantly, the space of the historic 'region', determined in part by technology and intelligence sharing, needs to complicate historical understandings of national, colonial, global connections. The experts and organizations who produced regional-global epidemiological intelligence, new communication links and movements, were beginning to shape possibilities of a vital statistics of the world.

The quarantine and infectious disease history is only one aspect of an emerging global population management over the 20th century, however. Too often scholarship on world health leaves sex and population to one side, replicating rather than interrogating the parameters of the official organizations themselves. When legal scholar David Fidler (1999) details a modern 'infectious disease diplomacy' deriving from quarantine, what he calls a *microbialpolitik*, we are left with the mistaken impression that questions of illness and death alone governed this period of 'biohistory' (Foucault, 1994: 134). The population experts of the early to mid-20th century, who insisted before, but like Foucault, on the interrelatedness of 'mortality, natality and migration' (Pearl, 1927), and who managed population as a spatial question as much as a reproduction question, need to be admitted into our analysis of world health. *Microbialpolitik* then becomes part of biopolitics, and the 20th-century genealogy of population becomes at once larger and stranger. Taken together, the 'natality' interests of the population experts, and the 'mortality and migration' interests of the formal organizations, constituted not just an 'international' biopolitics, but a nascent and accumulating global problematization of sex, death and movement.

Links—Empowerment**EMPOWERMENT IS AN EXERCISE OF REPRESSIVE POWER RELATIONS.**

Mitchell Dean, Professor, Sociology, Macquarie University, GOVERNMENTALITY: POWER AND RULE IN MODERN SOCIETY, London: Sage, 1999, p. 68-69.

Fourth, these relations of empowerment involve what Cruikshank calls a 'voluntary and coercive exercise of power upon the subjectivity of those to be empowered' (1994: 35). Here, relations of empowerment defeat the dichotomies by which we usually pose the problem of power — between power and powerlessness, consent and constraint, subjectivity and subjection. Governmental interventions, such as the CAPs, sought to create a set of conditions which required that the poor should act so that government might become effective. The poor were subjected to these programmes and to the authority of their agents in order that they might attain a certain type of subjectivity. Governmental regulation occurred so that the governed might exercise their freedom. Thus Cruikshank's study illustrates how government can depend upon the formation of certain types of subject with the capacity to exercise various forms of freedom and how contemporary government cannot be understood in terms of the dichotomies of conventional under-standings of power.

Links—Gender

Beginning From the Structure of Gendered Identity Makes Escape Impossible—These Identities are Constructed Within and By the Operations of Power, Not Neutral or Progressive

Judith Butler, Johns Hopkins University, "Sexual Inversions," Foucault and the Critique of Institutions. 1993

This is a limitation of Foucault's analysis. And yet he offers a counter- warning, I think, to those who might be tempted to treat femaleness or the feminine as an identity to be liberated. To attempt that would be to repeat the gesture of the regulatory regime, taking some aspect of "sex" and making it stand synecdochally for the entirety of the body and its psychic manifestations. Similarly, Foucault did not embrace an identity politics that might in the name of homosexuality combat the regulatory effort to produce the symptomatic homosexual or to erase the homosexual from the domain of intelligible subjects. To take identity as a rallying point for liberation would be to subject oneself at the very moment that tie calls for a release from subjection. For the point is not to claim, "yes, I am fully totalized by the category of homosexuality, just as you say, but only that the meaning of that totalization will be different from the one that you attribute to me." If identity imposes a fictive coherence and consistency on the body or, better, if identity is a regulatory principle that produces bodies in conformity with that principle, then it is no more liberatory to embrace an unproblematic gay identity than it is to embrace the diagnostic category of homosexuality devised by medico- juridical regimes. The political challenge Foucault poses here is whether a resistance to the diagnostic category can be effected that does not reduplicate the very mechanism of that subjection, this time-painfully, paradoxically-under the sign of liberation. The task for Foucault is to refuse the totalizing category under either guise, which is why Foucault will not confess or 'come out' in the History of Sexuality as a homosexual or privilege homosexuality as a site of heightened regulation. But perhaps Foucault remains significantly and politically linked to the problematic of homosexuality all the same.

Is Foucault's strategic inversion of identity perhaps a redeployment of the medicalized category of the invert? The diagnostic category "invert" presumes that someone with a given sex somehow acquired a set of sexual dispositions and desires that do not travel in the appropriate directions; sexual desire is "inverted" when it misses its aim and object and travels wrong headedly to its opposite or when it takes itself as the object of its desire and then projects and recovers that "self" in a homosexual object. Clearly, Foucault gives us a way to laugh at this construction of the proper relation between "sex" and "sexuality," to appreciate its contingency, and to question the causal and expressive lines that are said to run from sex to sexuality. Ironically, or perhaps tactically, Foucault engages a certain activity of "inversion" here but reworks that term from a noun to a verb. His theoretical practice is, in a sense, marked by a series of inversions: in the shift to modern power, an inversion is performed; in the relation of sex and sexuality, another inversion is performed. And with respect to the category of the "invert," yet another inversion is performed, one that might be understood to stand as a strategy of refiguration according to which the various other inversions of the text can be read."

The traditional invert gets its name because the aim of its desire has run off the rails of heterosexuality. According to the construction of homosexuality as narcissism, the aim has turned back against itself or exchanged it,, position of identification for the position of the object desired, an exchange that constitutes a kind of psychic mistake. But to locate inversion as an exchange between psychic disposition and aim, or between an identification and an object, or as a return of an aim upon itself is still to operate within the heterosexualizing norm and its teleological explanations. Foucault calls this kind of explanation into question, however, through an explanatory inversion that establishes sexuality as a regulatory regime that dissimulates itself by setting up the category of "sex" as a quasi -naturalistic fictive unity. Exposed as a fiction, the body becomes a site for unregulated pleasures, sensations, practices, convergences, and refigurations of masculine and feminine such that the naturalizing status of those terms is called radically into question. Hence the task for Foucault is not to claim the category of invert or of homosexual and to rework that term to signify something less pathological, mistaken, or deviant. The task is to call into question the explanatory gesture that requires a true identity and, hence, a mistaken one as well. If diagnostic discourse would make of Foucault an "invert," then he will invert the very logic that makes something like "inversion" possible. And he will do this by inverting the relation between sex and sexuality. This is an intensification and redoubling of inversion, one that is perhaps mobilized by the diagnosis but that has as its effect the disruption of the very vocabulary of diagnosis and cure, true and mistaken identity. This is as if to say: "Yes, an invert, but I will show you what inversion can do; I can invert and subvert the categories of identity such that you will no longer be able to call me that and know what it is you mean."

Links—Government Administration of Society**The Affirmative Embrace of the Social Contract is Based on Pastoral Aspects of Care That Support Governmentality**

Geoff Danaher et al, Central Queensland University, Tony Shirato, Central Queensland University, and Jen Webb, University of Canberra, Understanding Foucault, 2000

If Foucault is unwilling to accept either the social contract or warfare models as explanations of the history of, and changes to, governing, what does he propose in their place? He points to a number of important developments that can help us trace the emergence, and make sense, of governmentality. First, we have the institutionalising of different aspects of government. For example, whereas pastoral care (looking after the sick, the needy, and the morality of the people) was once the responsibility of the church, educators and physicians, gradually it came to be seen as something that the government should look after. Second, this change to the idea of what constituted government and governmental responsibility cannot be explained in terms of one group (say, bureaucrats, or the middle class) making a disguised grab for power. Rather, what happens is the emergence of a rationality ('the reason of state') which is not concerned with questions of how power can be maintained (for instance, 'how can merchants or bankers keep power?') but, instead, sets itself up as having answers to questions of government, and the well-being and prosperity of the state. So there is a movement from focusing on who has power and influence, to a rationality based on how power can be exercised most efficiently.

For Foucault this change in thinking produced two distinctive types of knowledge: a diplomatic /military aspect which concerns itself with external political security; and policy, which is understood as a set of technologies and institutions responsible for internal security, stability and prosperity. To this pair, Foucault adds a third, decisive element- economics.

This combination of forces and technologies was, according to Foucault, extremely productive. If the state's population came to be understood, first and foremost, as a resource, then the proper role of the state was population management. This required the production of knowledges that would allow the state to scientifically analyse that population, which was followed by the introduction of policies that both regulated behaviour (for the good of the individual, which meant, at the same time, for the good of the state), and kept the population happy and healthy--and therefore productive.

Links—Human Achievement

The Very Function of Space-Based Human-Machine Hybrid Technology Reveals the Ridiculousness of Celebrating Human-Achievement Itself—We Must Recognize Instead What Transcends Human Within the Human Itself

Chris Hables Gray, Associate Professor of the Cultural Studies of Science and Technology, University of Great Falls, Great Falls, Montana "Human-Machine Systems in Space: The Construction of Progress," Presented at a Meeting of the American Historical Society, 1999 (<http://www.chrishablesgray.org/CyborgCitizen/nasa.html>)

The term "cyborg" was actually created for NASA. In 1961 the noted psychiatrist Nathan Kline was asked to give a paper on adapting humans for space flight at a conference in Texas about the future of space exploration. He asked his friend and colleague, the self-taught computer scientist Manfred Clynes, to co-author the paper with him. Being experienced in the ways of government research and funding they decided to create a new word to describe in general terms the kind of human modifications they thought were possible and desirable. Manfred Clynes coined the term "cyborg" from cybernetic-organism, and Kline joked that it sounded like "a town in Denmark."

The Clynes and Kline paper, "Drugs, Space and Cybernetics" was later published as "Cyborgs and Space" in *Astronautics*, it defined a cyborg as an "exogenously extended organization complex functioning as an integrated homeostatic system unconsciously... In particular, they talked about using drugs and electronic implants to modify a human so he or she could exist in space without a space suit, although their concept includes less severe modifications as well as modifications to other organisms besides humans.

The term cyborg is actually a bit misleading, for according to cybernetic theory all organisms are governed by cybernetic laws in any event. But it is a catchy word and it has passed into mainstream use in science fiction, academia, and some parts of academic research and it has spawned similar labels such as cyberpunk, cyberspace, and "borg. However, NASA soon abandoned it.

At first NASA seemed comfortable with cyborg. It quickly initiated a study from United Aircraft Corporate Systems called "Engineering Man For Space: The Cyborg Study" which focused on artificial organs and psychopharmacology. But that was the last time NASA used the term cyborg as far as I could discover. Instead, in general terms it was replaced with bionic, man-machine integration, man-machine systems, bioastronautics, bioengineering, biocybernetics, biometry, human engineering, and human factors. For specific applications of cyborg technologies and techniques NASA used biosensors, biotelemetry, accustomization, adaptation, anthropometry, teleoperator systems, space suit, space craft, life support, and sanitation engineering.

NASA's rejection of the term cyborg certainly wasn't because of a desire to distance itself from science fiction, because NASA has consciously embraced the Star Trek opus, for example, to a surprising degree, even naming the first shuttle after the famous Enterprise spaceships.

And it wasn't because the concept cyborg wasn't technical or precise enough. Many of the terms that replaced cyborg in general use in NASA were very slippery. The term bionics, for example, fit comfortably into NASA usage. Bionics is especially interesting because it was originally coined by an Air Force psychiatrist, Major John Steele, to refer to the "reverse engineering" of nature to produce workable artificial systems. A bionic flight machine wouldn't be a plane, but rather would be an analog bird. Now in flight bionics isn't the best way to go, obviously, but in many other areas scientists and engineers learn a great deal from natural systems. Martin Caidin, the science fiction writer, interviewed both Clynes and Steele before writing his novel *Cyborg* which later became the TV series "The Six Million Dollar Man" which spun-off the series "The Bionic Woman." The theory was that the prosthesis used by the bionic man and woman were analogs to the natural limbs, and they were in function but certainly not in design.

But the adaptation of bionics, and the rejection of the label cyborg, shows something. A "bionic" man is a man who has been augmented; a cyborg is a new creature altogether. A cyborg is potentially a post-human; a human modified beyond being human. I think this is why, without any conscious decision I can find record of, NASA refused the term cyborg so completely. Because at every level of the organization, from the astronauts who were being cyborged to the bureaucrats at the top who always had to worry about the public perception of the program, the idea of the cyborg was very threatening.

This is reflected in the profound confusion over what is a man-machine system. Certainly this is a crucial issue when you talk about human-machine systems in space. Yet consider the definitions of three key terms, Man, Man-Machine, and Man-System, from the 1964 report "Human Factors Systems Program"

MAN Better understanding of man, his capacities, capabilities, and habitability requirements.

MAN-MACHINE Design requirements for equipment and subsystems; e.g. life support.

MAN-SYSTEM Design and integration requirements for aeronautic, astronautical, and ground support systems.

These definitions are quite useless in programmatic or conceptual terms. The only thing they do is defend the idea of "man" actually. In real practice, however, "man" was continually being deconstructed into various functions, categories, and machine interfaces. Even though NASA rigorously and relentlessly reconceptualized the astronaut as part of a basically machine system (see the accompanying illustrations, for example) the end logic of this transformation has been scrupulously avoided, even elided.

In fact, however, even though it is only in its earliest stages, it is clear that modifying humans for better integration with machines for space exploration and space habitation will eventually lead to post-humans. Clynes has predicted that the final stage of cyborgization is genetic modifications but even before that stage it is quite possible that people adapted to live in space will cease to be human in many important ways. They will be post-humans.

This denial isn't that surprising. Our culture as a whole is very resistant to looking very far into the future to see where cyborgization is taking us. The many political, ethical, and philosophical implications of the spread of cyborg technologies in the military, in medicine, in work and in exploration (deep sea and arctic as well as space) are really only addressed in science fiction and the fringes of academia (where I situate myself) as of yet.

Impacts—Extinction**Biopower is the Origin of Violence—Enabling its Unbridled Continuation Risks Extinction**

Michel Foucault, "The History Of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume 1", 1978 (p. 143)

If one can apply the term bio-history to the pressures through which the movements of life and the processes of history interfere with one another, one would have to speak of bio-power to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life. It is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes them. Outside the Western world, famine exists on a greater scale than ever; and the biological risks confronting the species are perhaps greater, and certainly more serious, than before the birth of microbiology. But what might be called a society's "threshold of modernity" has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a divine animal with the additional capacity for a political existence: modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question.

Impacts—Exclusion

Biopower Creates a Normalized and Public Communal Ethics Which Enforces Self-Censorship and Legitimizes Exclusion

Diane Rubenstein, Cornell University, "Did you Pack Your Bags Yourself? Governmentality after 9/11," The New Centennial Review, 2003, p. 324-5.

Rose's depiction of post-disciplinary societies that are governed through ethics brilliantly reframes Agamben's reading of Foucault, positing the emergence of a "community-civility" game of power (188). This new game is played on an ethico-political field and is intent on "maximizing the utility and docility of individuals" (disciplinary power), as well as "maximizing the health and welfare of the population" (biopower). Rose argues for the pertinence of his model at the close of the twentieth century (his book was published in 1999), but it is even more timely today: If discipline individualizes and normalizes, and biopower collectivizes and socializes, ethico-politics concerns itself with the self-techniques necessary for responsible self-government and the relations between one's obligation to oneself and one's obligation to others. . . . For it appears that somehow "we" the subjects of advanced liberal democracies—in the absence of any objective [End Page 325] guarantees for politics or our values, have become obliged to think ethically. (188) This new ethico-politics thus discriminates between forms of social life that are worth living. It must construct new forms of accountability, such as "audits" as "technologies of mistrust," even if these very technologies "fail to immunize the assemblages they govern from doubt" (154-55). In this new ethico-politics, the patriotic duty of the citizen is consubstantial with that of the subject. Neoliberal arguments meet up with their neosocial counterparts in a universe of fear-based preemptive law, with procedures of "reintegrative shaming" (271). There is always enough blame to go around. If the economy is performing poorly, it's your fault. (It is because you are not up to "taking risks" [145].) Rose describes a "new prudentialism" where someone must be held to account in a daily lifestyle of self-surveillance, from ethical shopping (buy green, eat vegan) to stress management. The neoliberal advanced citizen is proactive and prudent: no longer an atomized consumer, but now reterritorialized as a "community based life form" (166). Foucault's security, territory, and population has met its apotheosis in new Third-Way communitarian projects that create a kind of "natural extra political zone of human relations" (167). Citizenship, no longer tied to "birth" within a defined nation-state territory, is increasingly contingent upon conduct.

Impacts—Nazism**The Biopolitics of Government and Law are the Basis for the Ideologies of National Socialism**

Mitchell Dean, Sociology Professor at Macquarie University in Australia, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, 1999, p. 203

Even though we have conceived of the governmentalization of the state as a movement from the government of a complex of humans and things to a government through definite processes, there is a sense in which a rule over things remains a condition of the government of processes. The emergence of forms of governmental rationality from reason of state to social democracy can all be understood as a separation of an art of government from the state. However, the existence of a sovereign authority exercised over a territory 'forces open' the spaces in which government can operate and command, collect together and distribute the resources that it will use. In this way, modern forms of government cannot do without sovereign authority and without instruments such as law and taxation systems. Their historic relations with liberal, social and bio-political government no doubt transform sovereignty and the law. Law becomes part of normalizing institutions and acts more like a norm. Sovereignty becomes democratized and linked to the juridical and political rights of the citizen. All modern forms of rule must articulate the elements of sovereignty with those of bio-politics. As we have seen, this is as true for state socialism as for liberalism, for National Socialism as for social democracy. National Socialism is a particularly instructive example: here we see the sovereign elements of blood, lineage and fatherland rearticulated with the bio-political administration of the processes of life and death in a murderous, suicidal and genocidal manner.

Impacts—No Solvency

Operating Under the Framework of Biopolitics Dooms Your Affirmative—Even the Best Intentioned Policies are Subverted By Power

Michael Dillon, Professor of Politics, University of Lancaster and Julian Reid, "Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency," *ALTERNATIVES: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION & HUMANE GOVERNANCE* v. 25 n. 1, January/March 2000,

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[34] More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure—the fate and the fuel of all policy—compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy—and policy science—will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[36] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.

Impacts—Terror

The Biopolitical Regime is Associated With the Logic and Practice of Terror and Warfare

Julian Reed, "Immanent War, Immaterial Terror," *Multitudes*, June 2004,

(<http://multitudes.samizdat.net/Immanent-war-immaterial-terror.html>)

In this paradoxical context, which we might more realistically describe, after Achille Mbembe, as necropolitical (2003 : 11-40), it is imperative not only to continue to join in the longstanding critique of the martial strategies of liberal peace but also to reinvigorate our understanding of the immanent necessity of war to the limitless movements of life that liberal peace attempts to block through its incessant pursuit of biopolitics.² This is the precise foundation of a counter-strategic response to the impositions of liberal techniques of discipline, control and regulation that has empowered a tradition of thought which stretches back as far as Clausewitz and Nietzsche. This tradition is most readily identifiable in much of the later works of Foucault, as well as others who have adapted their own polemologies against liberal peace from him - most notably, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, as well as Antonio Negri.³ In turn, this is also the form of argument we see empowering the renewal of radical democratic traditions of 'politics as war' in response to the current onslaught of liberal terror defined by the global extension of biopolitical techniques of control, shaping the responses of liberal societies to their new insecurities.⁴ For a better grasp of what is at stake in this present conjuncture, we must therefore reverse the terms in which this struggle is being articulated, and speak of the prosecution of 'Terror on War'. The concept of war refers here to what is most material and immanent to the dignity of human life, and the concept of terror - to that which is most abstract from it. Far from representing a war upon an immaterial abstraction as its discourse otherwise suggests, this is a conflict incited by an immaterial regime of biopower dedicated to the terrorizing of life's most material instinct - war.⁵ If the discourse of peace was fundamental to the consecration and development of biopower in the modern nation-state, it has become as - if not more - fundamental to the increasingly biopolitical forms of regime that have now exceeded the traditional form of the nation-state. These biopolitical forms of regime now function as the bedrock of a globalizing order, in the name of the extension of which terror is being conducted today. The global control of populations via technologies deriving from the molecular and digital revolutions, the targeting of the natural life of individual bodies through biometric techniques, hail the formation of biopolitical regimes that are in the process of establishing new thresholds of strategic virtuosity.⁶ Contesting the globalizing tendencies of those biopolitical regimes which now exceed the traditional nation-state form necessarily involves not only refusing their most fundamental value of peace and exposing their foundation in terror, but also engaging in the further and decisive act of retrieving the constitutive dignity of war as the font of life. In this sense it means not only contesting the ways in which peace has been formulated as a response to the political problem of war - formulations which have themselves been, and continue to be, constitutive of the failures of modernity to realize in any tangible sense its foundational ideal of peace - but also insisting on the retrieval of the irreducible force of war that liberal regimes attempt to capture and put to work in the reproduction of their docile social orders. The current conflict provides clear testimony to both these paradoxical features : liberal regimes' propensity to terrorize populations into submission and the irreducibility of the force of war to the vagaries of terror. If the current prosecution of Terror on War represents the vainest of attempts to trap the movements of war within the narrow confines of a biopolitical account of human being, as well as testifying to the decrepitude of the liberal ideal of a pacified humanity, it also bears witness to the indissolubility of the warrior class.

Impacts—War**The Operations of Power are Responsible for the Politics of War—the Logic Extends to a Battle Which Would Result in Total Extermination**

Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," *Power/Knowledge*, 1980, p. 90-91

So this would be the first meaning to assign to the inversion of Clausewitz's aphorism that war is politics continued by other means. It consists in seeing politics as sanctioning and upholding the disequilibrium of forces that was displayed in war. But there is also something else that the inversion signifies, namely, that none of the political struggles, the conflicts waged over power, with power, for power, the alterations in the relations of forces, the favouring of certain tendencies, the reinforcements etc., etc., that come about within this 'civil peace'—that none of these phenomena in a political system should be interpreted except as the continuation of war. They should, that is to say, be understood as episodes, factions and displacements in that same war. Even when one writes the history of peace and its institutions, it is always the history of this war that one is writing. The third, and final, meaning to be assigned to the inversion of Clausewitz's aphorism, is that the end result can only be the outcome of war, that is, of a contest of strength, to be decided in the last analyses by recourse to arms. The political battle would cease with this final battle. Only a final battle of that kind would put an end, once and for all, to the exercise of power as continual war.

Impacts—War**Governmental Control and Understandings of Biopolitics Connects to the Administration of War and Death**

Mitchell Dean, Sociology Professor at Macquarie University in Australia, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, 1999, p. 99-100

Here, following Foucault, I shall employ the term 'bio-politics' to designate a very broad terrain on and against which we can locate the liberal critique of too much government and its advocacy of what Benjamin Franklin called 'frugal government'.² Bio-politics is a politics concerning the administration of life, particularly as it appears at the level of populations. It is 'the endeavour, begun in the eighteenth century, to rationalize problems presented to governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birth rate, longevity, race' (Foucault, 1997a: 73). It is concerned with matters of life and death, with birth and propagation, with health and illness, both physical and mental, and with the processes that sustain or retard the optimization of the life of a population. Bio-politics must then also concern the social, cultural, environmental, economic and geographic conditions under which humans live, procreate, become ill, maintain health or become healthy, and die. From this perspective bio-politics is concerned with the family, with housing, living and working conditions, with what we call 'lifestyle', with public health issues, patterns of migration, levels of economic growth and the standards of living. It is concerned with the bio-sphere in which humans dwell. We might say that there is an internal and an external side to bio-politics (Lui-Bright, 1997). There is a social form of government concerned to govern the life and welfare of the populations that are assigned to certain states; and there is also a kind of international bio-politics that governs the movement, transitions, settlement and repatriation of various populations - including refugees, migrants, guest workers, tourists and students.

Alternative Solvency

Pretending a Neutral and Objective Viewpoint Only Masks the Function of Biopower—The Assumption of a Specific Intellectual Standpoint is Crucial to Reveal These Patterns of Domination

David Owen, Professor of Social and Political Philosophy at University of Southampton, *Morality and Modernity*, 1994, pp (208-210)

The 'universal' intellectual, on Foucault's account, is that figure who maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which the pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for generating norms) grounds politics in the 'truth' of our being (e.g. our 'real' interests). The problematic form of this type of intellectual practice is a central concern of Foucault's critique of humanist politics in so far as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. If, however, this is the case, what alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can Foucault present to us? Foucault's elaboration of the specific intellectual provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn't know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow, for he is too attentive to the present (PPC p. 124) The historicity of thought, the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside time, leads Foucault to locate intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to the present in terms of what is singular and arbitrary in what we take to be universal and necessary. Following from this, the intellectual does not seek to offer grand theories but specific analyses, not global but local criticism. We should be clear on the latter point for it is necessary to acknowledge that Foucault's position does entail the impossibility of 'acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits' and, consequently, 'we are always in the position of bargaining again' (FR p. 47). The upshot of this recognition of the partial character of criticism is not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but, in so far as it involves a recognition that everything is dangerous, a 'hyper and pessimistic activism' (FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very historicity and particularity of criticism which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ideal critique and real transformation. Foucault suggests that the activity of critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are but rather of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought the practices we accept rest (PPC p.154) The genealogical thrust of this critical activity is 'to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident is no longer accepted as such' for 'as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible' (PPC p. 155). The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in which it is embedded) as the form of our autonomy, although this urgency is given its specific character for modern culture by the recognition that the humanist grammar of this thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics. The specificity of intellectual practice and this account of the activity of critique come together in the refusal to legislate a universal determination of 'what is right' in favour of the perpetual problematization of the present. It is not a question, for Foucault, of invoking a determination of who we are as a basis for critique but of locating what we are now as the basis for reposing the question 'who are we?' The role of the intellectual is thus not to speak on behalf of others (the dispossessed, the downtrodden) but to create the space within which others can speak for themselves. The question remains, however, as to the capacity of Foucault's work to perform this crucial activity through an entrenchment of the ethics of creativity as the structures of recognition through which we recognize our autonomy in the contestation of determinations of who we are.

Alternative Solvency

Rejection is the Basis for Establishing New Discourses that Challenge the Strategies of Power

Brent Pickett, Associate professor of Political Science at Chaldron State College, On the Use and Abuse of Foucault For Politics, 2005 (pp. 40-41)

A prominent aspect of humanism, one which Foucault is particularly concerned with attacking, involves references to a 'normal' individual based upon the scientific discourses of psychiatry or criminology. By legitimating what is done in prisons and asylums, the categories of humanism "dispel the shock of daily occurrences."²⁶ Humanism is also the legitimating force behind liberal democracy. It tells people that although they do not have power, they are still the rulers: "In short, humanism is everything in Western civilization that restricts the desire for power: it prohibits the desire for power and excludes the possibility of power being seized."²⁷ Because of its effects, Foucault argues that it is necessary to undermine the categories and central concepts of humanism. One of the most effective ways of doing this, Foucault claims, is to learn from those who have been the direct targets of power and repression, learn how they were "divided, distributed, selected, and excluded in the name of psychiatry and of the normal individual, that is, in the name of humanism."²⁸ Their memories, histories, and knowledges are concerned with power and struggles, not with the categories of humanism. This insurrection of subjugated knowledges unmasks previously hidden techniques of power. Since Foucault believes that power is only acceptable to the degree that it is hidden, this insurrection of knowledge will lead to direct action against the central institutions of contemporary culture. At the heart of humanism, according to Foucault, is the theory of the subject. Foucault means two things by 'the subject.' The first is the subject of a hierarchical political order. This is the humanist notion of the 'sovereign' individual who is subjected to the laws of society, nature, truth, and God. The subject, even though he exercises no power, is the sovereign. The humanistic theory of the individual rests, Foucault contends, upon a subjected will to power. That is, the very desire for power is to be eradicated from the individual in the name of truth, nature, and society. In order to achieve the "'desubjectification' of the will to power," that is in order to liberate the desire to take power, it is necessary to engage in political struggle.²⁹ During the early 1970s Foucault repeatedly emphasized that one does not struggle against power because it is morally just; instead it is simply a struggle to take power.³⁰ The notion of the individual as subject, as fixed within a series of hierarchies that limit and constrain, is overthrown through this war for power. The second aspect of the theory of the subject is the reference to a 'normal' subject. Modern definitions of normalcy are invariably constructed by the human sciences. This fiction of what a normal person is like has important effects, according to Foucault, in courtrooms, prisons, and various other institutions such as universities. The attack on the normal subject is achieved through breaking the various taboos placed upon the individual. Drug experimentation, communes, and disregard for gender lines are all possible examples of this.³¹ Another source of struggle against humanism, and the mechanisms of power that it supports, is what Foucault envisions as a 'new intellectual.' In contrast to the traditional theorist, who formulated a totalizing theory apart from the masses and led them with it, the new intellectual does not aspire to guide the masses. He does not impart knowledge to them. Indeed, the masses know better than he, which is why the intellectual must learn from those most exposed to power. The theories constructed from the memories and struggles of factory hands and inmates are local, not global. The new intellectual is not the bearer of truth; instead his theory is merely one more tool in the struggle against power.³² Furthermore, Foucault argued that it is dangerous to formulate a universalistic theory. Struggle must not be made in the name of a new Utopia. "I think that to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system."³³ There is a strong temptation to describe a certain human nature, argue that this nature is repressed or distorted by society, and thereby give the outlines of a new, just order. Foucault is adamant that this temptation be resisted. The danger is that the description of human nature will itself be unwittingly drawn from the contemporary power system.³⁴ One becomes entrapped in the very system one is trying to oppose: These notions of human nature, of justice, of the realization of the essence of human beings, are all notions and concepts which have been formed within our civilization, within our type of knowledge, and our form of philosophy . . . and one can't, however regrettable it may be, put forward these notions to describe or justify a fight which should—and shall in principle—overthrow the very fundamentals of our society.³⁵ Instead of opposing the ideal to the real, Foucault suggests that the new intellectual oppose the real to the real. Exposing the specific, concrete workings and events of the prison, asylum, and other institutions is enough to justify action. Once certain "intolerables" are revealed, such as the prevalence of suicide in French prisons, a struggle has been created.

Alternative Solvency

The Rejection of Biopolitical Discourses Sets the Stage for Fundamentally Transforming the Dynamics of Utopianism Regarding Social Organization

Brent Pickett, Associate professor of Political Science at Chaldron State College, On the Use and Abuse of Foucault For Politics, 2005 (pp. 40-41)

The ultimate goal of these various tactics and techniques, such as genealogy or learning from those most affected by power, is the incitement of local struggles against the modern power system. These actions must be led by those most subject to their constraints. Students must fight a "revolutionary battle" against schools; prison inmates should revolt and thereby be integrated into the larger political struggles.⁴¹ Only those directly involved in the battle can determine the methods used. Three institutions are most important to Foucault in this period. The revolt against these institutions must simultaneously involve concrete agitation and ideological critique. First, schools are important primarily because they transmit a conservative ideology masked as knowledge. Second, psychiatry is important precisely because it extends beyond the asylum into schools, prisons, and medicine: in short, "all the psychiatric components of everyday life which form something like a third order of repression and policing."⁴² Finally, and probably most importantly to Foucault, there is the judicial system since it relies upon the fundamental moral distinction of guilt/innocence. This allows "the most frenzied manifestation of power imaginable" to masquerade as "the serene domination of Good over Evil, of order over disorder."⁴³ The judiciary actually blocks direct action through the construction of an allegedly neutral structure that stops real struggle in the here and now and instead arbitrates in the realm of the ideal. Moreover, the judicial system performs a number of functions which prevent revolution, such as controlling the most volatile people who might spearhead a revolt and introducing internal divisions within the masses so that one group will see the other as "dangerous" or "trash." For these reasons it is vital that the judiciary be attacked. Foucault gives examples of the "thousands of possibilities" for "anti-judicial guerilla operations," including escaping from the police and heckling in the courts.⁴⁴ Ultimately, Foucault calls for "the radical elimination of the judicial apparatus."⁴⁵ Yet agitation cannot be limited to prisons, schools, and asylums; it must extend into factories and streets. This raises an essential point. Totalizing theory is rejected, but Foucault does support total revolution. If theory is to be local and discontinuous, how is revolutionary action to gain its larger coherence? "The generality of the struggle specifically derives from the system of power itself, from all the forms in which power is exercised and applied."⁴⁶ The diffuse yet unitary nature of power allows for these various agitations across society to finally achieve coherence, thereby eliminating the need for imagining a new system. Although Foucault criticizes those who still feel this need for a global theory and its Utopia, he himself occasionally gives suggestions about what a better system would look like. Most prominent here is a desire for a lack of hierarchy, including class divisions. For instance, when speaking about the events of May 1968, Foucault said, "It is of the utmost importance that thousands of people exercised a power which did not assume the form of a hierarchical organization."⁴⁷ A second feature of a better society appears to be a radical pluralism bordering on anarchy. Foucault strongly disagrees with those who invoke "the whole of society" when formulating plans for revolutionary action.⁴⁸ Such an ideal, he contends, itself arises from a Utopian dream. It also has the detrimental effect of limiting possible avenues of struggle. If prisoners feel that they must take over their prison, they are not to be dissuaded from this because of what is thought to be best for the whole of society. Only those directly involved at each local site of action can determine the methods used and the goals sought. "The whole of society is precisely that which should not be considered except as something to be destroyed. And then, we can only hope that it will never exist again."⁴⁹

Alternative Solvency**Resistance is Intrinsic To Power—We Must Recognize the Coexistence of Freedom and Power to Make Any Truly Free Decisions**

Ascanio Piomell, Associate Clinical Professor, Hastings College of the Law, "Foucault's Approach to Power: Its Allure and Limits for Collaborative Lawyering," Utah Law Review, 2004, p. lexis

Resistance as Intrinsic to Power. According to Foucault, a central reason for the dynamism, the changeability, of power relations is that resistance is part of every relation of power. ¹³⁶ As he put it in *The Will to Know*, "where there is power, there is resistance," a resistance which is "never in a position of exteriority in relation to power," but rather is "inscribed ... as an irreducible" part of the power relationship. ¹³⁷ He believed there is something in the social body and in each of us that resists efforts to shape us or manage our behavior; ¹³⁸ thus, in any such power relation "there is necessarily the [*427] possibility of resistance[,] ... of violent resistance, of escape, of ruse, of strategies that reverse the situation." ¹³⁹ The only requirement is an exercise of courage, a refusal to acquiesce. ¹⁴⁰ Thus, where others posit simple obedience or acquiescence, Foucault sees strategic maneuvering and resistance.

The Centrality of Freedom of Action. In his later works, he made explicit that resistance is always possible because freedom is an indispensable aspect of power. As he wrote in 1982, "power is exercised only over free subjects, and only in so far as they are "free,"" by which he meant "individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behavior are available." ¹⁴¹ At the heart of his evolved understanding of the power relationship, Foucault insisted that even those on what one would traditionally call the receiving end of power are "active subjects" - they retain at least a capacity for action - and can take advantage of "a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions." ¹⁴² As Winter has elaborated, even in a hierarchical or asymmetrical relationship, a subordinate can "couch her performance anywhere along the broad spectrum that stretches from deferential compliance through shamming, grumbling, sulking, foot-dragging, "working to rule," limit-testing, and mocking all the way to outright defiance." ¹⁴³

Alternative Solvency

The Task of the Specific Intellectual is to Understand and Study the Themes of Politics in Relation to Power

Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 1980, p.130-131

Now let's come back to more precise details. We accept, alongside the development of technico-scientific structures in contemporary society, the importance gained by the specific intellectual in recent decades, as well as the acceleration of this process since around 1960. Now the specific intellectual encounters certain obstacles and faces certain dangers. The danger of remaining at the level of conjunctural struggles, pressing demands restricted to particular sectors. The risk of letting himself be manipulated by the political parties or trade union apparatuses which control these local struggles. Above all, the risk of being unable to develop these struggles for lack of a global strategy or outside support; the risk too of not being followed, or only by very limited groups. In France we can see at the moment an example of this. The struggle around the prisons, the penal system and the police-judicial system, because it has developed 'in solitary', among social workers and ex-prisoners, has tended increasingly to separate itself from the forces which would have enabled it to grow. It has allowed itself to be penetrated by a whole naive, archaic ideology which makes the criminal at once into the innocent victim and the pure rebel— society's scapegoat— and the young wolf of future revolutions. This return to anarchist themes • of the late nineteenth century was possible only because of a failure of integration of current strategies. And the result has been a deep split between this campaign with its monotonous, lyrical little chant, heard only among a few small groups, and the masses who have good reason not to accept it as valid political currency, but who also— thanks to the studiously cultivated fear of criminals—tolerate the maintenance, or rather the reinforcement, of the judicial and police apparatuses. It seems to me that we are now at a point where the function of the specific intellectual needs to be reconsidered. Reconsidered but not abandoned, despite the nostalgia of some for the great 'universal' intellectuals and the desire for a new philosophy, a new world-view. Suffice it to consider the important results which have been achieved in psychiatry: they prove that these local, specific struggles haven't been a mistake and haven't led to a dead end. One may even say that the role of the specific intellectual must become more and more important in proportion to the political responsibilities which he is obliged willy-nilly to accept, as a nuclear scientist, computer expert, pharmacologist, etc. It would be a dangerous error to discount him politically in his specific relation to a local form of power, either on the grounds that this is a specialist matter which doesn't concern the masses (which is doubly wrong: they are already aware of it, and in any case implicated in it), or that the specific intellectual serves the interests of State or Capital (which is true, but at the same time shows the strategic position he occupies), or, again, on the grounds that he propagates a scientific ideology (which isn't always true, and is anyway certainly a secondary matter compared with the fundamental point: the effects proper to true discourses).

Alternative Solvency

Individuals can Struggle Effectively in Political Response to the Operations of Power

Mitchell Dean, Sociology Professor at Macquarie University in Australia, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, 1999, p 198

We have followed Foucault in defining government very broadly as the 'conduct of conduct' – the more or less deliberate attempt to shape the actions of others or of oneself. By studying government in this sense as an assemblage of practices, techniques and rationalities for the shaping of the behaviour of others and of oneself, we are contributing to a critique of political reason, if that means that we are investigating the surfaces of emergence of political discourse and action. We cannot claim, however, to have completed the study of politics and of power relations. Alongside the techniques and rationalities of government stand what Foucault termed 'strategic games between liberties' or what Weber called 'politically oriented action' (Foucault, 1988a: 19; Weber, 1968: 55). Both these ideas stress the nature of politics as a struggle or competition between competing forces, groups or individuals attempting to influence, appropriate or otherwise control the exercise of authority. Thus while government, in our sense, is a condition of political action and rationality, it does not exhaust it. As Hindess (1997) has shown, political reason is not equivalent to governmental rationality, and it is misleading to use the terms interchangeably. It follows that governmental rationality might try to regulate politics, and that this is particularly the case where government seeks to operate through free individuals – as it does in the case of liberal forms of rule. Thus many of the institutional and constitutional arrangements of liberal democracies – from doctrines of the separation of powers to the representative institutions themselves – are precisely attempts to do that. Further, many of the techniques of 'advanced' liberal government are also attempts to govern political actors such as government departments, public servants and politicians by promoting quasi-market relations between them, and between them and their clients, or by removing the provision of public services from the sphere of political decision altogether (1997: 265).

Alternative Solvency

The Understanding of Historical Power is the Way to Criticize Offensive Structures and Renew Positive Individualism

Mitchell Dean, Sociology Professor at Macquarie University in Australia, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, 1999, p. 44.

The ethico-political impulse of this kind of critical intellectual work can also be described in positive terms. This practice of genealogy might be said to have two impulses meshing behind the critical orientation to historical material. The first of these might be called diagnostic in the sense detected by Deleuze (1991). This is an orientation to the present as an open set of possibilities rather than as portending catastrophe, witnessing decay or promising fulfilment. Yet it is a present subject to knowable limits and constraints, not least of which would be the vocabularies and forms of reason by which we make politics thinkable, the mechanisms by which this politics is accomplished and the manner in which we understand ourselves as those who govern and are governed. The ethos of this type of genealogy is of militancy grounded in scholarly moderation. It is militant in that the problems it addresses are called into focus by social and political movements and localized struggles. Yet it does not urge such movements to overturn everything or to 'subvert all codes'. Genealogy is led to undertake a task of some complexity requiring considerable erudition: to sort out what we take to be necessary and contingent in the ways in which we think and act in regard to the 'conducting' of our lives and those of others, and to discover what problematizations of this are possible. Further, it is the attempt to discern which of these problematizations indicate lines of fracture and transformation and which indicate a consolidation of regimes of government. In this diagnostic mode, genealogy is less a refuge from disaster and more a cautious initiation into the conditions of a renewed task of political invention. Its cautious militancy and intellectual moderation places the ethos of genealogy against all the dire prognostications on the fragmentation of identity and the ills of 'mass society'. Genealogy is thus an attempt to renew acquaintance with the strangeness of the present against all the attempts to erase it under the necessary dialectic of reason in history or to mark it as a moment of millenarian rupture, final denouement or irreversible loss.

AT: Alternative Cannot Get Rid of Power
The Alternative Does Not Get Rid of Power—It Changes Our Relation to It and the Understanding of Its Connotations in 5 Specific Ways

Ascanio Piomell, Associate Clinical Professor, Hastings College of the Law, "Foucault's Approach to Power: Its Allure and Limits for Collaborative Lawyering," Utah Law Review, 2004, p. lexis

In proposing a radically different approach to thinking about power, Foucault urged the abandonment of at least five elements of what he saw as the reigning view of power. Steven Winter has usefully characterized Foucault's approach as a rejection or fundamental modification of almost all of the basic metaphors that shape our unexamined, traditional conception of power. ¹⁰³ In Foucault's own words, he sought to displace the "ready made patterns" when one speaks of power: the images of "a political structure, a government, a dominant social class, the master facing the slave, and so on." ¹⁰⁴ Those patterns were "not at all" what he meant by power, or his preferred formulation, "relationships of power." ¹⁰⁵

First and fundamentally, Foucault rejected the idea or metaphor that power is a thing. As Foucault approached it, power is neither a thing nor a possession - no one can hold it. Similarly, power is not a resource, nor is it a capacity. "Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away" ¹⁰⁶ As he approaches it, power does not belong to anyone; it is not a property of an individual or a group. In rejecting these fundamental images of power as a thing, possession, resource, or capacity, Foucault rejected the core ideas of both liberal and Marxist conceptions of power: in his view, power cannot be transferred or delegated through any social contract from the people to a sovereign or government, nor can it belong to one social class nor be seized by another. ¹⁰⁷

Second, Foucault rejected the notion of a stable division between the [*423] powerful and the powerless or between the rulers and the ruled. ¹⁰⁸ He spurned the assumption of "a massive and primal condition of domination" and "a binary structure with 'dominators' on the one side and 'dominated' on the other." ¹⁰⁹ He also refused to see power as all-or-nothing, as a capacity or tool of the dominant. As he put it, power is not a phenomenon of "consolidated and homogenous domination" by an individual, group, or class; nor is it "that which makes the difference between those who exclusively possess and retain it ... and those who do not have it and submit to it." ¹¹⁰

Third, Foucault declined to think of power as a location. For him, power does not reside in a particular place. ¹¹¹ It has no seat, bastion, pinnacle, or center. Nor is there any centralized source, such as law, the economy, or the State, from which it stems or flows. ¹¹² As he put it, the point of view that enables one to understand the exercise and effects of power "must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point." ¹¹³

Fourth, he refused to see power as a force that is always exerted in essentially the same manner, ¹¹⁴ from the top down or the center out. ¹¹⁵ He rejected any notion of power "extending from the top down ... to the very depths of the social body." ¹¹⁶ In Winter's formulation, Foucault rejected the metaphor that power or control is necessarily "up." ¹¹⁷

Fifth, and of special import given the intellectual currents that predominated in France in the early 1970s, Foucault emphatically rejected the notion that power is primarily a repressive force that forbids and silences. His intellectual targets were contemporary Marxists and "para-Marxists" such as Herbert Marcuse and Wilhelm Reich, who sought to synthesize the ideas of [*424] Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. According to Foucault, such an approach presented (capitalist) power's sole function as repression and its sole mode of operation as "censorship, exclusion, blockage and repression, in the manner of a great Superego, exercising itself only in a negative way." ¹¹⁸ He urged that one should not look to political theory for the emblematic form of power; that is, one should not think of power in terms of sovereignty with a legislative authority that lays down or states the law ¹¹⁹ to which obedient subjects must submit. ¹²⁰

Foucault labeled the set of conceptions of power that he sought to displace the "juridico-discursive" model of power. ¹²¹ In this view, power is juridical because, like a sovereign, it states the law that its subjects must obey; it is discursive because the law or command that it announces is essentially an edict, a negative imperative, a "thou shalt not." ¹²² As he summarized it, this model presents power as "poor in resources, sparing of its methods, monotonous in the tactics it utilizes, incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed always to repeat itself" because it is essentially just "a power to say no; ... capable only of posting limits, it is basically anti-energy." ¹²³

AT: Framework**The Question of Producing the Subject is a Prior Question to That of Policy Making—Our Criticism is Necessary Before We Evaluate the Affirmative**

Steven L. Winter, Professor, Law, University of Miami, "The 'Power' Thing," VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW v. 82, August 1996, p. 797-798.

Foucault's alternative conception of power avoids the problems of effectiveness and compliance because, as is widely recognized, it too emphasizes the productive dimension of power. n254 What sharply differentiates Foucault's approach from the others, however, is that it does not understand productive power as the particular province or tool of dominant groups. Instead, it sees productive power in the processes that construct individuals as individuals in the first place. In a widely cited passage, Foucault advised that we not ... ask why certain people want to dominate, what they seek, what is their overall strategy. Let us ask, instead, how things work at the level of on-going subjugation, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours etc. In other words, ... we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, [*798] materials, desires, thoughts etc. We should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects. n255

AT: Framework**Discourse Produces Subjects Within Language—The Questions About the Affirmative are Critical to Deciding How/When/If We Should Act**

Geoff Danaher et al, Central Queensland University, Tony Shirato, Central Queensland University, and Jen Webb, University of Canberra, Understanding Foucault, 2000

This idea of the self-knowing, individual subject in control of his or her thoughts and actions permeates our culture to such an extent that we never really question it. Contemporary popular culture provides plenty of examples of how this idea is both reinforced and valued. Think of any contemporary film hero or heroine—Harrison Ford fighting terrorists in *Patriot Games* or *Clear and Present Danger*, Sigourney Weaver up against aliens and the company in the *Alien* films, or the whole *Star Trek* crew in their battles with the Borg: in all these examples the 'good guys' are individuals who think for themselves, reason things out, and make decisions. This supposedly distinguishes them from terrorists, aliens and cyborgs, all of whom are driven by something (fanatical political beliefs, instinct, programming) over which they have no control. Foucault rejects this idea of the self-governing subject, pointing out that what comes between ourselves and our experience is the grounds upon which we can act, speak and make sense of things. For Foucault, one of the most significant forces shaping our experiences is language. Try coming up with a thought, or making sense of an experience, without using language to do so. We not only use language to explain our ideas and feelings to others, we use it to explain things to ourselves. Foucault is not so much interested in language systems as a whole, as in individual acts of language-or discourse. Discourses can be understood as language in action: they are the windows, if you like, which allow us to make sense of, and 'see' things. These discursive windows or explanations shape our understanding of our- selves, and our capacity to distinguish the valuable from the valueless, the true from the false, and the right from the wrong. For Foucault, while we are not just programmed or driven by instinct, our thoughts and actions are influenced, regulated and to some extent controlled by these different discourses. A good example is in the first *Alien* film, where the crew have been taught to unthinkingly identify with, and serve, the company and its discourses, values and ways of doing things (putting profit, productivity, and economic rationalism above human life). They think that they are acting as free individuals, but it is only when it becomes clear that the company thinks that they are expendable do they start to question what has been happening to them.

AT: Habermas**Habermas' Conception of Discourse is Inadequate—He Ignores the Function of Productive Power—You Should Prefer the Alternative**

Jessica J. Kulynych, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Winthrop University, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation," *POLITY* v. 30 n. 2, Winter 1997, pp. 315-346.

However, Habermas's discursive formulation is inadequate primarily because it does not explicitly and rigorously attend to the disciplinary effects of contemporary societies explained so creatively by Foucault. Habermas has been routinely criticized for ignoring the productive nature of contemporary power. His juxtaposition of system and life-world in *The Theory of Communicative Action* relies on a separation of good power from bad (communicative power v. steering media), and posits an ideal speech situation freed from the distortions of power.(22) More importantly, Habermas's theorization of discursive participation is exceedingly abstract and does not adequately attend to the ways in which power informs discourse. A number of theorists have effectively argued that women and men do not stand in equal relationship to language. For example, Linda Zerilli argues that discursive space is a "fraternal community of unique and symbolic dimensions."(23) Women utilize language in this discursive world "whose 'common' and symbolic language ... enables one user to understand what another is saying; just as it compels each speaker to constrain himself within the limits of an existing political vocabulary."(24) In this case the content of speech is systematically limited in direct violation of the required conditions for the ideal speech situation. The foundations of communication are not the ideal equal relationships that Habermas imagines, but are instead an exclusive, learned, and gendered, symbolic heritage. As Carole Pateman points out, women enter into public discussion on a very tenuous plane. The symbolic heritage that defines the meaning of key communicative concepts such as consent systematically excludes women from the category of individuals capable of consenting.(25) The mere existence of a debate over whether "no means no" with regard to consensual sexual relations and rape is a manifestation of this heritage. Women can hardly be seen as equal participants when they do not have the same opportunity to express their intent.

AT: Institutions Can Solve Power**Institutions Bear an Intrinsic Mark of Power—Within Them There is No Possibility to Criticize Successfully**

John D. Caputo and Mark Yount, Villanova University, St. Joseph's University, "Institutions, Normalization, and Power." Foucault and the Critique of Institutions. 1993

The connection between Foucault and institutions seems an obvious one, but not because he wanted to make the institution the basic unit of analysis. On the contrary, Foucault situated institutions within the thin but all-entangling web of power relations. He did so explicitly in *Discipline and Punish*, and he subsequently read his later analysis between the lines of his earlier works. In this genealogy, institutions are the more readily definable macro-objects, grosser instruments for the finer, more elemental workings of power. Power is the thin, inescapable film that covers all human interactions, whether inside institutions or out.

Institutional structures are saturated with sexual relations, economic relations, social relations, etc., and are always established of these power relations: relations between men and women, old and young, senior and junior, well-born and starved, colorless and colored, Occident and Orient. Institutions are the means that power uses, and not the other way around, not sources or origins of power. The analysis of power is thus always more fine-grained than any analysis of classes, of states, or of institutions in their own terms would be. That is why for Foucault—and for all of the studies that follow here--the workings of power cannot be described from the standpoint of a master discipline, especially a perspective that would seek an origin for power, or take political power to be its initial or privileged form. It is always a question of analyzing institutions from the standpoint of power, and not of analyzing power from the standpoint of institutions.'

But we ought not to speak of power in the substantive, for there is no such thing. Instead, sets of "power relations" bathe the structures

AT: Marxism

Power is Diffuse, Not Centralized—The Marxist Notion of Base-Superstructure is Precisely the Opposite of Foucauldian Power

Jennifer Cotter, "Eclipsing Exploitation: Transnational Feminism, Sex Work, and the State", *The Red Critique*, Spring 2001 (http://www.redcritique.org/spring2001/spring_2001.htm)

According to Kaplan and Grewal, "there is no space outside of [existing] power configurations," and no "binary" position from which to overthrow them, and thus feminism must "negotiate" with the existing structures of violence and power ("Transnational" 356). Such a view, of course, is itself based on the rather reactionary notion of power that Foucault has spelled out in his *History of Sexuality*, Vol. 1. For Foucault, power is autonomous from any "general system of domination" such as capitalism "exerted by one group over another" (92). Power relations have their own "immanent logic" that is "not . . . the effect of another instance that 'explains' them" (94-95). This is, to be clear, in direct contrast to the orthodox Marxist understanding that "power" derives from the private ownership and control of the means of production and is thus, at its basis, the capacity to command over the surplus-labor of others. By contrast, Foucault claims, "relations of power are not in superstructural positions" to production (94). Instead, power is a "multiplicity of force relations" that "comes from everywhere" (93). Moreover, there is no material basis for revolutionary struggle "instead, there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case" (96). Power cannot be overthrown because "there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations" (94). That is, power is not concentrated in the hands of a few rather, it is diffuse, traverses all social sites, and is available to appropriation by all.

Focus on Capital and Labor Movements is a Distraction From the Actual Operations of Power—Historical Materialism is Subordinate to the Alternative

Mark Olssen, University of Surrey, "Foucault and Marxism; rewriting the theory of historical materialism," *Policy Futures in Education*, 2004
(www.worlds.co.uk/pdf/validate.asp?j=pfie&vol=2&issue=3&year=2004&article=3_Olssen_PFIE_2)

Poster explains what he sees as Foucault's greater relevance than Marxism in terms of a shift from nineteenth- and early twentieth-century forms of capitalism based upon the 'mode of production' to new forms of later twentieth-century capitalism based upon the 'mode of information'. These changes were associated, says Poster, with changes in the nature of the economy, an increase in the service and white collar sectors, the increasing development of information technology, developments in electronic communications, together with new possibilities that these developments generate for a decentralisation of political power. While Marxism's focus on labour and the central causal priority of the economy may have had heuristic value in the age of ascendant capitalism, in an era of 'information capitalism' historical materialism finds its premise in power that is the effect of 'discourse/practice'. Thus, according to Poster: the couplet discourse/practice ... enables [Foucault] to search for the close connection between manifestations of reason and patterns of domination. Foucault can study the way in which discourse is not innocent, but shaped by practice, without privileging any form of practice such as class struggle. He can also study how discourse in turn shapes practice without privileging any form of discourse. (Poster, 1984, p. 12) Foucault thus rejects Marx's conception of historical materialism as a mechanism by which discourse is split from material (non-discursive) practice and by which the former is then subordinated to the latter. By representing the mental operations of consciousness as derivative from the material base of society, Marx, for Foucault, remains firmly fixed within a traditional enlightenment problematic (Poster, 1984, pp. 16-18).

AT: No Alternative**Criticism is Itself the Alternative—Societal Transformation Depends Upon Us Understanding Society in the First Place**

Michel Foucault, *College de France, POWER*, ed. J.D. Faubion, 1994, p. 456.

I'll reply first to the point about not having "produced any results." There are hundreds and thousands of people who have worked for the emergence of a certain number of problems that are now actually before us. Saying that such efforts have not produced any results is completely false. Do you think that twenty years ago the problems of the relation between mental illness and psychological normality, the problem of imprisonment, the problem of the relation between the sexes, and so on, were raised as they are today? Furthermore, there are no reforms in themselves. Reforms do not come about in empty space, independently of those who make them. One cannot avoid considering those who will have to administer this transformation. And then, above all, I don't think that criticism can be set against transformation, "ideal" criticism against "real" transformation. A critique does not consist in saying that things aren't good the way they are. It consists in seeing on what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking the accepted practices are based. We need to free ourselves of the sacralization of the social as the only instance of the real and stop regarding that essential element in human life and human relations—I mean thought—as so much wind. Thought does exist, both beyond and before systems and edifices of discourse. It is something that is often hidden but always drives everyday behaviors. There is always a little thought occurring even in the most stupid institutions; there is always thought even in silent habits. Criticism consists in uncovering that thought and trying to change it: showing that things are not as obvious as people believe, making it so that what is taken for granted is no longer taken for granted. To do criticism is to make harder those acts which are now too easy. On the other hand, as soon people begin to have trouble thinking things the way they have been thought, transformation becomes at the same time very urgent, very difficult, and entirely possible. So there is not a time for criticism and a time for transformation; there are not those who have to do criticism and those who have to transform, those who are confined within an inaccessible radicality and those who are obliged to make the necessary concessions to reality. As a matter of fact, I believe that the work of deep transformation can be done in the open and always turbulent atmosphere of continuous criticism. Understood in these terms, criticism (and radical criticism) is utterly indispensable for any transformation. For a transformation that would remain within the same mode of thought, a transformation that would only be a certain way of better adjusting the same thought to the reality of things, would only be superficial transformation.

AT: Objective Truth

There is No Objective Power-Free Conception of Truth—Law is Necessarily Imbued With Political Ideas

Ascanio Piomelli, Associate Clinical Professor, Hastings College of the Law, "Foucault's Approach to Power: Its Allure and Limits for Collaborative Lawyering," Utah Law Review, 2004, p. lexis

Another way of approaching Foucault's project is to view it as a critical interrogation ⁶⁸ of our contemporary Western rationality. ⁶⁹ He sought to analyze who we are now - "the nature of the present" and of "ourselves in the present" - and how we got to be this way. ⁷⁰ His goal was to question ideas and practices in order to discover what it might mean to think and act differently. ⁷¹ He strived to detach himself from received ways of thinking and acting - and he encouraged his readers to do the same. ⁷² The key aim, in his view, "is not to [*416] recover our lost identity, or liberate our imprisoned nature, or discover our fundamental truth; rather, it is to move toward something altogether different." ⁷³ As he put it:

My project is ... to give some assistance in wearing away certain self-evidences and commonplaces about madness, normality, illness, crime, and punishment; to bring it about ... that certain phrases can no longer be spoken so lightly, certain acts ... no longer so unhesitatingly ... performed; to contribute to changing certain things in people's ways of perceiving and doing things; to participate in this difficult displacement of forms of sensibility and thresholds of tolerance ⁷⁴

To make sense of his interrogation of contemporary rationality, it helps to identify the ideas, conventions, and practices that he sought to displace.

Foucault wanted his readers to recognize that the orthodox approach to the history of ideas has a decided tilt. It recounts a fitful but continual march of progress toward truth by detailing the innovations of a series of intellectual heroes clearing the path towards the accuracy of our current ideas. ⁷⁵ Foucault rejected the presumption that today's knowledge is necessarily better or truer than the past's; instead, he focused on the entire realm of past thoughts, not just those that successfully continue into or directly lead to our current ideas. ⁷⁶ [*417] A key aim of his genealogical method was to uncover the "buried, subjugated knowledges" that were ultimately defeated in what he saw as the battlefield, not the marketplace, of ideas. ⁷⁷

At the same time, he sought to displace the notion of objectively verifiable truth that he saw as pervading the human sciences. For Foucault, there is no outside viewpoint from which any of us can independently verify general statements about humans as true; we and our truths about our kind are all products of our times and dominant discourses. ⁷⁸

His emphasis on how our ideas and understandings of ourselves are constantly remade led him to reject the notion of a fixed, unchanging human nature that transcends history and is the source for shaping or making sense of history. ⁷⁹ For Foucault nothing human is fixed, everything is a product of history, discourse, and other elements of the cultural environment. ⁸⁰ A recurring theme in his work is that "nothing is ever stable" - thoughts, practices, institutions, even human bodies, are always susceptible to dramatic change. ⁸¹

AT: Permutation**The Role of the Institution is to Intervene Against the Intellectual—The Idea that We Can Use it as an Intermediary Destroys the Alternative**

Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 1980, p. 26-27

FOUCAULT: Fine. But you will grant me that what is thought by the mass of the French proletariat is not the thought of Mao Tse-Tung and it is not necessarily a revolutionary ideology. Moreover, you say that there must be a revolutionary state apparatus in order to regulate this new unity between the proletariat and the marginalised people. Agreed, but you will also grant me that the forms of state apparatus which we inherit from the bourgeois apparatus cannot in any way serve as a model for the new forms of organisation. The court, dragging along with it the ideology of bourgeois justice and those forms of relations between judge and judged, between judge and the parties to the action, between judge and litigant, which typify bourgeois justice, seems to me to have played a very significant role in the domination of the bourgeoisie. When we talk about courts we're talking about a place where the struggle between the contending forces is willy-nilly suspended: where in every case the decision arrived at is not the outcome of this struggle but of the intervention of an authority which necessarily stands above and is foreign to the contending forces, an authority which is in a position of neutrality between them and consequently can and must in every case decide which party to the dispute has justice on its side. The court implies, therefore, that there are categories which are common to the parties present (penal categories such as theft, fraud; moral categories such as honesty and dishonesty) and that the parties to the dispute agree to submit to them. Now, it is all this that the bourgeoisie wants to have believed in relation to justice, to its justice. All these ideas are weapons which the bourgeoisie has put to use in its exercise of power. This is why I find the idea of a people's court difficult to accept, especially if intellectuals must play the roles of prosecutor or judge in it, because it is precisely the intellectuals who have been the intermediaries in the bourgeoisie's spreading and imposing of the ideological themes that I'm talking about.

AT: Permutation**Refusing to Give Up the Notion of Government in the Struggle Against Discourses of Power
Dooms the Struggle to Failure**

Mitchell Dean, Sociology Professor at Macquarie University in Australia, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, 1999, p. 47

The elaboration of a notion of government marks the definitive rejection of a certain type of radical declamatory rhetoric of power and the beginning of a project to think about the problem of regulation outside earlier models of power. The focus on government seeks to displace both the notion of power as repression or interdiction that Foucault had traced to the 'juridical-political theory of sovereignty' and his own earlier attempts to rethink power in terms of 'the discourse of war and domination'. 'Power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government . . . [which] did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; rather it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or groups might be directed' (Foucault, 1982: 221). Importantly, then, the notion of government stands as an attempt to pose the question of the epistemological and technical conditions of existence of the political, to analyse the historical a priori by which we construct politics as a domain of thought and action, and to analyse the instrumentation, vocabulary and forms of reason by which this is done. If, for Kant, 'critique' is the study of the conditions of true knowledge, the study of governmentality is a kind of critique of political reason, in as much as it seeks to investigate some of the hitherto silent conditions under which we can think and act politically. Perhaps, as we have suggested before, given the association of critique with the universal foundations of truth and right, it is better to refer to Foucault's task as a criticism of political reason, as he does in the English title of his lectures at Stanford (Foucault, 1981).

AT: Permutation**Resistance Within Power is Necessarily Subverted, It Can Never Produce a Fundamental Break With Power**

Mika Ojakangas, "Sovereign and Plebs," Telos, Spring 2001

These plebeian points of resistance are not only the internal limit of power,⁽ⁿ³⁰⁾ but also the motivation "for every new development of networks of power."⁽ⁿ³¹⁾ For this reason, plebeian resistance is indispensable not only for an analysis of the apparatus of power, but also for power itself. As the Schmittian sovereign, it is constitutive (the "chemical catalyst") in relation to networks of power.⁽ⁿ³²⁾ Foucault's plebs (political resistance) occupy the same place as Schmitt's sovereign (political decision), who is "outside the normally valid legal order," but "nevertheless belongs to it" as a constitutive element. The plebs are outside networks of power, yet they belong to them, not as integral parts, but actually in relation to their totality.' "Where there is power, there is resistance."⁽ⁿ³³⁾ They "found" the networks of power in toto. Of course, the plebs do so by resisting norms and decisions, i.e., "power relations." Yet, the function of the plebs is exactly the same as Schmitt's sovereign decision. They are "located in the break [la rupture]"⁽ⁿ³⁴⁾ of the panoptic power in the same way as the Schmittian sovereign is located in the break of the valid legal order. In both cases, this break is decisive. Therefore, the plebs and the sovereign, the point of resistance and of decision, are both "borderline concepts" belonging to the same sphere, i.e., the "extreme sphere,"⁽ⁿ³⁵⁾ which nourishes every rule. While Schmitt thought that this founding "borderline concept," which decides on the state of exception, is the sovereign, Foucault outlines the counter-figure of the plebs, which, even without deciding on anything, is indispensable and even constitutive in relation to networks of power.

AT: Power is Everywhere So the Alt Can't Solve

The Fact that Power is Everywhere is the Primary Reason that the Alternative Is Possible—The Inclusion of Power Necessarily Brings the Possibility of Resistance, By Mapping These Networks

Hugh Baxter, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University, "Bringing Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault. Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance," Stanford Law Review, January, 1996, p. lexis

Foucault's "analytics of power" challenges the conception of power as a purely negative or repressive force.³⁷ For Foucault, power is productive: "it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth."³⁸ Foucault does not trace power back to a single point, the point of sovereignty.³⁹ Rather, he contends that power relations are omnipresent and diffused throughout society as "the immediate effects of the divisions, inequalities, and disequilibria which occur" in social relationships.⁴⁰ Thus, rather than analyzing power relations from the perspective of the sovereign, Foucault's "microphysics of power"⁴¹ emphasizes "power at its extremities ... those points where it becomes capillary ... its more regional and local forms and institutions."⁴² These "infinitesimal mechanisms" of power "each have their own history, their own trajectory, their own techniques and tactics."⁴³ Beginning from these dispersed points, one can conduct an "ascending analysis of power" investigating how local techniques and tactics of power are linked to "more general powers or economic interests."⁴⁴

In displacing the traditional notion of power as sovereign command, Foucault emphasizes that power relations include not just the application of force, but also resistance. For Foucault, the very existence of power relations "depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance."⁴⁵ Resistance, understood as the "irreducible opposite" in the exercise of power, can take various forms - perhaps [*454] appearing as active opposition, but perhaps instead simply as "target, support, or handle in power relations."⁴⁶

As with power relations in general, Foucault's "microphysics of power" first investigates resistance at the local level. "There is no single locus of great Refusal,"⁴⁷ he maintains, but instead "a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case."⁴⁸ For Foucault, to analyze power relations in a given society is to map the "network" or "dense web"⁴⁹ of forces - the interrelations among tactics, strategies, and technologies of power and resistance.

Foucault's historical studies set this conceptual framework into motion. In those works, particularly in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault sought to historicize the relation between sovereign, monarchical power, and the specifically modern forms of power that emerged in the seventeenth century. Foucault calls these modern forms of power "disciplinary power."⁵⁰ The opposition between law-as-sovereign-power, on one hand, and disciplinary power, on the other, is one of the key themes of Foucault's work on power. It will also turn out to be essential to Foucault's "expulsion of law" from modernity.⁵¹

AT: Impact Predictions Good**The Future is Not Pre-Determined—The Affirmative Assumes a Continuity and Stability in Subjects that Does Not Exist**

Raymond Duvall and Jonathan Havercroft, Professor of Critical International Relations at the University of Minnesota, Professor in Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, "Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire of the future.", in *Review of International Studies*, 2008 (Proquest)

In examining constitutive effects scholars ask how structured social relations, such as systems of signification (Foucaultian discourses), and the processes of their (re-)production constitute what a referent object is as a social kind. To engage in constitutive analysis, then, is to investigate the social determination of the ontology of a being or form. ²¹ Our concern, however, is with not-yet-realised social beings and social forms of the future. How does one analyse the social constitution of that which does not yet exist? The answer, we maintain, lies in examination of the structural logics of social production. Structured social relations entail (often very powerful) reproductive logics, the constitutive implications of which can be discerned even prior to their effectuation. Those constitutive implications are structural potentialities and tendencies – likelihoods – not determinant products, of course. But to the extent that operative reproductive logics of generative structures are strong, future constitutive effects can be identified with some degree of confidence. This is precisely the character of Marx's analysis of capital, as well as Wendt's argument about teleology and the inevitability of a world state and Herz's argument about the loss of the state's 'hard shell'. ²²

AT: Realism**The Affirmative Doesn't Operate Based on Realism—The Strategies of Biopolitics Ensure Empire and Collusion Rather than Competition**

Raymond Duvall and Jonathan Havercroft, Professor of Critical International Relations at the University of Minnesota, Professor in Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, "Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire of the future.", in *Review of International Studies*, 2008 (Proquest)

The strategy of the empire of the future undermines the binary logic of a states-system predicated either on territorially bounded sovereign states or a globally diffused, decentralised and deterritorialised biopolitical Empire as proposed by Hardt and Negri. Our analysis reveals a third possibility: in the empire of the future space power combines a set of otherwise heterogeneous processes. Space based missile defence strips all states – except the possessor of the system – of their hard shells by eroding nuclear deterrence capabilities, while providing the possessor of missile defence with a territory more secure from nuclear attack. Space control denies all states with the exception of the controlling power unfettered access to space. Furthermore it annexes orbital space as a territory of the space power. Finally, force application from orbital space makes any point on earth a potential target for the military force of empire of the future. This makes the traditional imperial imperative to project force through controlling territory no longer necessary. Empire of the future combines strategies of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation to simultaneously undermine some features of state sovereignty and reinforce others. Therefore the current assumption that many IR theorists make that international society must be based on either a collection of sovereign territorial states or deterritorialised biopolitical apparatuses ignores the possibility that these two processes can be co-constitutive. In the empire of the future the locus of authority is centralised but this authority governs a deterritorialised political entity. While this new constellation of political power will present new possibilities for resistance, we should not underestimate how this empire's new modes of killing will constitute structures of domination potentially more terrifying than anything humanity has yet encountered.

Aff—Politics Good

Political Determinations and Decision Making are Crucial to Developing a Positive Progressive Politics

Henry A. Giroux, Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, *Beyond the biopolitics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age*, 2008

(<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504630802343432>)

Opposing neoliberalism, in part, suggests exposing the myths and conditions that sustain the shape of late modern politics as an economic, social, and pedagogical project. This means addressing neoliberalism as both a mode of rationality and as a unique intersection of governmentality and sovereignty that shapes every aspect of life. Engaging neoliberalism as a mode of governmentality that produces consent for its practices in a variety of sites requires that educators and others develop modes of pedagogical and political interventions that situate human beings as critically engaged social agents capable of addressing the meaning, character, fate, and crisis of democracy. Against a biopolitics of neoliberalism and its anti-democratic tendencies, educators, artists, intellectuals, and others might consider selectively reclaiming John Dewey's (1916/1966) notion of democracy as an ethical ideal and engaged practice informed by an active public open to debate, dialogue, and deliberation.¹⁷ Dewey rejected any attempt to equate democracy and freedom with a market society, and he denounced ritualistic definitions of democracy that he felt reduced it to the periodic rituals of elections, conceding meaningful actions to formal political institutions. According to Dewey (1927), democracy was a 'way of life' that demanded work, a special kind of investment, desire, and willingness to fight those antidemocratic forces that produced what he called the 'eclipse of the public'. Dewey believed that democracy demanded particular competencies, modes of understanding, and skills that enabled individuals both to defend certain institutions as vital public spheres and to equate public freedom with the capacity for debate and deliberation and a notion of politics that rejects any commitment to absolutes. If democracy was to survive, Dewey argued that it had to be nourished by pedagogical practices that enabled young people and others to give it the kind of active and constant attention that makes it an ongoing, neverending process of replenishment and struggle. Hannah Arendt builds upon Dewey's concerns about what it means not only to rethink the meaning of democracy in dark times, but also to put into place those pedagogical conditions that enable people to speak from a position of critical agency and to challenge modes of authority that speak directly to them. While Arendt did not provide a theory of pedagogy, she argued passionately about connecting any viable notion of democracy with an educated public. For her, neither democracy nor the institutions that nourished it could flourish in the absence of individuals who could think critically, exercise judgment, engage in spirited debate, and create those public spaces that constitute 'the very essence of political life' (Arendt, 1977, p. 241). Arendt recognized that any viable democratic politics must offer an informed and collective challenge to modes of totalitarian violence legitimated through appeals to safety, fear, and the threat of terrorism. She writes: Terror becomes total when it becomes independent of all opposition; it rules supreme when nobody any longer stands in its way. If lawfulness is the essence of non-tyrannical government and lawlessness is the essence of tyranny, then terror is the essence of totalitarian domination. (Arendt, 1976, p. 162) If, as both Arendt and Dewey argued, human beings become superfluous in societies that eliminate the conditions for debate and critical engagement, it is all the more important to once again rethink the relationship between democracy and politics in an age that relegates ethics along with the social state to the dustbin of history. Arendt believed that persuasion, reflective judgment, and debate were essential to politics, while Dewey viewed it as a fragile enterprise that could only be kept alive as an ongoing struggle to preserve a democratic ethos.

Aff—Perm Solvency**The Diffusion of Power Requires Multiple Modes of Resistance—The Plan and the Alt Must Occur in Conjunction**

Brent Pickett, Associate professor of Political Science at Chaldron State College, On the Use and Abuse of Foucault For Politics, 2005 (pp. 5)

This argument is clearly in tension with some of Foucault's own proposals. Indeed, the notion of a transparent society marked by a Rousseauian general will is a Foucaultian nightmare. Democracy itself is based upon the diffusion of disciplines. Yet a carefully formulated "communitarianism" need not lead to postmodern anguish.³ There are several immediate reasons for this. First, the proposals suggested by Foucault, Connolly, Hooke, and others, such as a new form of rights or an aesthetic approach to ethics, cannot be implemented without a large measure of collective, democratic support. This is because of the nature of 'capillary' power as described by Foucault. In his view, power is so ubiquitous, insidious, and flexible that it is implausible to suggest that individuals acting alone could successfully combat it. Furthermore, this collective support cannot be gained without moral argumentation and appeals to shared values. An exclusive use of genealogical investigations and deconstructions of others' moral views is not sufficient. The conception of democracy and collective action endorsed here does not emphasize a postmodernist agonism or contestation, though such heated debate often proves salutary. Instead, moral debate which seeks consensus and which in turn motivates group action is seen as a better ideal. Still, collective action and democratic institutions can and should embody practices and goals that Foucault himself would support.

Aff—Foucault's Resistance Fails**Foucault's Understanding of Resistance is Under-Developed, It Cannot Be Adequately Used to Challenge Law**

Ascanio Piomell, Associate Clinical Professor, Hastings College of the Law, "Foucault's Approach to Power: Its Allure and Limits for Collaborative Lawyering," Utah Law Review, 2004, p. lexis

Another irony of Foucault's approach to power is that despite its imperative to study how power is exercised (i.e., what happens when power is exercised) ³⁵¹ and its insistence that resistance is everywhere, ³⁵² Foucault did not examine resistance in any depth. Unlike his detailed scrutiny of the mechanisms and techniques of power, ³⁵³ he never extensively studied the tactics and mechanisms that people and groups use to resist efforts to shape their behavior and ideas. Consequently, his ideas on power offer little, if any, guidance on how to resist effectively. ³⁵⁴ His work treats resistance more as an article of faith than as a practice (or set of practices) worthy of detailed analysis. ³⁵⁵ Because collaborative lawyers invest significant efforts engaging in just such an examination with the clients and communities with whom they work, Foucault's failure here does not hinder collaborative lawyering practice.

Moreover, Foucault's vision of power pays little attention to the differential costs and risks of resistance. He often notes that relationships are unequal and asymmetrical and that the consequences of resistance fall heavily on those in subordinate positions. ³⁵⁶ But besides noting these inequalities, he does not focus any more attention on them. His insistence that resistance is always possible, that it simply requires courage, ³⁵⁷ would likely strike many of the individuals and groups with whom collaborative lawyers work as glib and out-of-touch, if not off-putting.

To work effectively with such individuals and groups, one needs a far deeper and more nuanced appreciation of the potential costs and risks of resistance than Foucault provides. While the theoretical possibility of resistance may be comforting and even energizing, the real, everyday issue for most people and groups is what cost they will, or can afford to, bear for any [*473] particular form of resistance - and how to minimize the toll actually exacted. ³⁵⁸ One needs to recognize, discuss, and jointly strategize about the possible ramifications of different acts of resistance. ³⁵⁹ Facile exhortations to courage are insufficient; real discussions are imperative. (In such discussions, a responsible collaborator will not presuppose that people or groups can or should pay the price that resistance will require, nor will she unintentionally dissuade those willing to pay that price or to raise their threshold of tolerance.) Any theory or practice that fails to attend to the potential costs of resistance, and to focus on minimizing them, risks irrelevance. Thus, collaborative lawyers must - and do - explore the complex reality of resistance, its methods and its costs, in far greater detail than Foucault did. ³⁶⁰

Aff—Must Use the Law**Using Legal Institutions is Good—The Law is Necessary to Access New Movements, To Change Structures and Communicate Effectively**

Nick Smith, Ph.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt University, "Incommensurability and Alterity in Contemporary Jurisprudence," Buffalo Law Review, Spring/Summer, 1997, p.lexis

Sunstein takes the expressive dimension of the law, that being "the law's role in reflecting and communicating particular ways of valuing human goods," very seriously. n164 Sunstein explains that legal statements promote certain standards of appropriate and inappropriate valuation. He writes, [*551] "if the law says the act of murder can or cannot be met with the death penalty, social norms may be influenced. If the law wrongly treats something--say, reproductive capacities--as a commodity, the social kind of valuation may be adversely affected. If the law mandates recycling, subsidizes national service, or requires mandatory pro bono work, it may have healthy effects on social valuations of the relevant activities." n165 Sunstein recognizes that the way we value is "not a presocial given, but a product of a complex set of social forces, including law," and therefore opinions expressed by the legal system play an important role in the formation of our culture's interpretation of the proper respect for and evaluation of a variety of things. Sunstein provides several examples of how the law communicates such ideas, including its stance on issues such as capital punishment, school prayer, and discrimination. n166 "A society might protect endangered species," for example, "partly because it believes that the protection makes best sense of its selfunderstanding, by expressing an appropriate valuation of what it means for one species to eliminate another." n167 In this respect the law can espouse and promulgate a belief in incommensurability by resisting the types of comparisons and equations drawn by utilitarians and law and economics scholars. As Radin describes, n168 the law currently blocks exchanges that are considered inappropriate, and such political statements asserting that one thing cannot be traded for another denounce and repudiate universal commodification and the assertion that all things are merely the substantiation of a single good.

Aff—Alternative Cannot Produce Action**Despite His Useful Thoughts—Foucault's Alternative is Problematic and Cannot Be Utilized For Action**

Eve L. Mullen, Temple University, "Postmodernism and Social Praxis: Attempting to Put Foucault in Action Through the Theology of Sharon Welch," Schuylkill, Spring 1998, (<http://www.temple.edu/gradmag/spring98/mullen.htm>)

In Communities of Resistance and Solidarity, as well as in A Feminist Ethic of Risk, Sharon D. Welch sets forth a liberation theology in which the deconstructive processes of Michel Foucault are key. Her theology is an amalgam of Foucault's poststructuralist concepts and liberation theology's action-oriented motivation. Welch claims the genealogical methods of Foucault are ideal motivators, urging the activist to political involvement. However, Michel Foucault's genealogy was not intended for such pragmatic applications. Foucault's purpose in writing genealogies was never action-oriented. He only set out to "show those changes." By definition, genealogy never rests in one discourse or on one "truth." Foucault, as an "interpreter," emphasizes the necessary tension between keeping distance from historical discourse and awareness of one's inescapable position in historical discourse. In short, the genealogist can never rest on his or her laurels: seeming bases of "truth" are actually constantly changing historical constructions. While Welch claims not only to possess this type of awareness, but also to recognize its absolute necessity for her theology, she is in danger of defeating her own goals: with no solid foundations, no fixed truths, on which to base liberation theology's arguments, how can her action-oriented methodology be fruitful? Welch claims to have put Foucault in action: how accurate is this claim? How effective are Foucault's methods, never intended for practical use, for Welch's liberation theology? The purpose of this paper is to examine these questions and the accuracy of Welch's treatment of Foucault's concepts by exploring the relevant works of Sharon Welch and the works of Foucault referenced therein.

Aff—Permutation Solvency**Theorization Alone is Not Enough—We Can Use Foucauldian Notions Productively in a Criticism of Biopower While Dealing With Social Questions**

Jerry Floersch, Mandel School of Applied Social Sciences, Case Western Reserve University, "Book Review - Reading Foucault for Social Work," 1999 (<http://msass.case.edu/faculty/jfloersch/foucaultreview.html>)

For example, to bring the mentally ill out of hospitals and into the community was undivided theory put into practice. The theory asserted that all people, severely mentally ill or not, should live together in the community. But in normalizing severe mental illness, community support service practice made the long-term mentally ill different. They did this to make claims upon social services; otherwise, they would be unnecessarily abandoned-as many are-to the streets, homeless shelters, and jails. Consequently, as we seem practically incapable of placing all our clients in the same social category, then why should social work expect itself to abandon divided practice? Moreover, under what political or other conditions might the promotion or dissolution of dividing practices become appropriate? Are there no social, political, and psychological boundaries to be respected and even promoted? And how do bio-power techniques actually produce their effects? These questions point to Foucault's own theoretical limitations not discussed by the authors or editors of this volume and frequently found in the Foucauldian critiques of social work.(1)

If Foucault is going to have relevance for social work practice, then we must study how bio-power-divided and undivided practice-actually produces effects. Alone, it is insufficient to merely theorize those effects. On this point, John Devine's essay (Chapter Ten) offers important criticism. Devine describes an urban school where teachers fail to regulate and discipline bodies. He shows how an alternative school program reintroduces bio-power techniques to recreate the discipline of learning. Devine demonstrates that dividing practices do not necessarily result in docile, disempowered bodies. Though effective in raising provocative social work questions, Devine shows that the concept bio-power becomes problematic when studying failed attempts to regulate bodies. Thus, his essay raises the spectre for Foucauldians to theorize "good" and "bad" (dividing?) bio-power techniques.